New paper in AJP: 'Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments'

This is just a quick note that my former student, Micah Summers, and I have a new paper, 'Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments', forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Here is the abstract:

Various theorists contend that we may live in a computer simulation. David Chalmers in turn argues that the simulation hypothesis is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of our reality, rather than a sceptical scenario. We use recent work on consciousness to motivate new doubts about both sets of arguments. First, we argue that if either panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then the only way to live in a simulation may be as brains-in-vats, in which case it is unlikely that we live in a simulation. We then argue that if panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then viable simulation hypotheses are substantially sceptical scenarios. We conclude that the nature of consciousness has wide-ranging implications for simulation arguments.

Hope some of you find it interesting!

 

Comments

[Brad]

Congratulations to both of you!

[Marcus Arvan]

Thanks!