Why we ought to collaborate with philosophers across the globe: a reply to Peter Singer

There has been quite some pushback against Peter Singer, who recently said in an interview in the New Yorker that he was not particularly interested in working together with African philosophers.  Because many people do not have a subscription to The New Yorker, I put the relevant part of the interview below: 

Daniel Gross: "A lot of your works cite white male academics who, for lack of a better phrase, take up a lot of space in intellectual conversations... Because so much of your work is fundamentally about equity, I wonder if that is something that’s on your radar."

Peter Singer: "That’s the manner in which I was educated, I suppose, and which still is very influential in the ideas that I’m involved with. I’ve certainly worked with a lot of philosophers who are not male, but they have been white generally. I’ve got a project now about the issue of global population, with Alex Ezeh, a demographer of Nigerian origin at Drexel University. I worked with Pascal Kasimba when I was at Monash University, who is of African descent, on a project relating to in-vitro fertilization. I have also co-authored things with people of Asian descent, with Yew-Kwang Ng, for instance. But, I have to say, I want to work with people whose ideas are, you know, at a level of discussion that I’m interested in, and that I’m progressing. If you’re thinking of the work of Africans, for example, I don’t know the work of many of them that is really in the same sort of—I’m not quite sure how to put this—participating in the same discussion as the people you’ve just mentioned." 

This is not an uncommon sentiment, though it is rarely expressed in this explicit manner (but then, most academics aren't interviewed and aren't asked this question!).

The sentiment is that philosophers from the global south are not really worth engaging with, because their work would not be at the same level as the more prestigious, well-known (mostly white and male) philosophers from wealthy countries.

I want to argue here that this view is mistaken, and also that not engaging with philosophers and philosophies from the global south presents a missed opportunity. I write this in response to Singer, but I also aim this discussion to the wider readership here. (For example, if you think that you are not subject to these ideas and you're at an American or British department, try to think of e.g., some philosophers working in Ghana or South Africa, two African countries with a vibrant philosophical history and tradition. It may be hard to do so!).

Let's look more closely at Singer's idea of "participating in the same discussion". It is true that disproportionately many philosophers outside the anglophone west are not partaking in the most prestigious academic discussions, as is done in top peer-reviewed journals, monographs and edited volumes by presses such as Oxford University Press, Cambridge, Princeton etc. They do not participate in the prestigious conferences, they are not part of hiring networks and citation networks. As far as this goes, Singer is correct that there is little "participating in the same discussion". 

A different way to look at this lack of participation is to shift perspective: anglophone, western departments are insular, mostly engaging with a narrow group of narrow peers. We are a bit like Mrs Bennet in Pride and Prejudice, who proudly declares that "we dine with four-and-twenty families". Obviously, there are many more families, but these are not of the correct social standing, and deemed not worth engaging with. This gives the illusion of interconnectedness while one continues to engage only with a narrow subset of people. 

Because publications in the most prestigious venues in academic philosophy (overwhelmingly by Anglo-American philosophers) are so insular, they don't really need to engage with works from other countries or traditions. As Eric Schwitzgebel summarizes "97% of citations are citations of work originally written in English; 96% of members of editorial boards of elite Anglophone philosophy journals are housed in majority-Anglophone countries". 

The way in which anglophone, western departments cite, invite and hire primarily from each other is not purely due to meritocratic reasons, but rather, to what Eric Schliesser calls the "credit economy" of academic philosophy, as he writes, "Professional philosophy is best compared to a credit economy with currency controls".

We try to curry favor with prestigious individuals and departments. The credit economy of academic philosophy further amplifies existing inequities, given that research-focused American departments (who disproportionately benefit from the credit economy) already have so much structural advantage in terms of research funds and academic freedom. More engagement with philosophers outside of the credit economy would diversify the field.

In addition to this consideration of justice, there are also practical considerations for Peter Singer (and all of us, as I said, this failure to engage philosophies and philosophers across the globe falls on most of us!). Namely, building out a truly global philosophical community would make us better philosophers. It will also help us to make philosophy do what we want it to do. That is, for Singer in particular but for many of us, to improve the philosophical infrastructure of our societies. Mary Midgley calls this "philosophical plumbing"

Plumbing and philosophy are both activities that arise because elaborate cultures like ours have, beneath their surface, a fairly complex system which is usually unnoticed, but which sometimes goes wrong. In both cases, this can have serious consequences. Each system supplies vital needs for those who live above it. Each is hard to repair when it does go wrong, because neither of them was ever consciously planned as a whole. . . . Whether we want it or not, the way our society is organized is deeply philosophical (Midgley, 1992, 139)

How will we, for example, as philosophers consult and help with the vexing problem of locust plagues in East Africa, a result of complex patterns of climate change? The locusts swarm out from the deserts in the Arabian peninsula and the Sahara, if there is abnormally much water and vegetation, this changes their physiology and behavior and gives rise to devastating swarming behavior, causing some of the worst outbreaks in Kenya and surrounding places since 70 years.

It will simply not do for western outsiders to make a quick and easy effectively altruist calculation of the ideal dosage and distribution of insecticide, at least not in the long term, as this is a stopgap measure. Rather, we need conversations about how we will globally come to terms with, mitigate, and further prevent the adverse effects of climate change. Such conversations require some form of localism, i.e., talking with stakeholders and people who are directly affected.

The paternalist attitude of trying to solve this with abstract models like the veil of ignorance just not going to suffice. Our philosophical plumbing is insufficient. Not only will localism help to get a genuine conversation with stakeholders, not just treating people in the global south as some passive recipients of help waiting to be saved, it will also improve our philosophy. Already now, we are benefiting from insights from African philosophy such as the concept of ubuntu (listen to this podcast for a very clear, helpful explainer) which gives us new insights into how individuals can relate, retain their individuality and their specific strengths and weaknesses, and help each other flourish.

I want to end by briefly reflecting on our experience with the project "The Cocoon Goes Global", an initiative of The Philosophers' Cocoon to give a truly global picture of how philosophy is being done around the world. Running this has been a sobering experience. It is striking how large the variability is of support for philosophers between different countries. For example, departments in South Korea or Colombia offer decent wages, incentives to publish or to organize conferences. On the other side of the spectrum you have philosophers who work under shockingly adverse circumstances, including violence, very low wages, aging libraries, in Nigeria. There are huge variations across the world. 

In some countries I am unable to recruit any philosopher to write anything, because they are concerned about limitations on freedom of speech by governments and even the university (which might terminate their contract if they didn't write a glowing picture!) I think that philosophers at anglo-American departments don't quite realize how much freedom of speech they have! This realization is very daunting, along with the almost non-existent support in some countries for philosophy, it urges us to express more solidarity.

Another striking observation is that philosophy in many countries across the world ties in in a very concrete way with the concerns of students and with the local political situation. Philosophers at departments across the globe reckon with the often racist legacies of colonial predecessors, and frame and examine emergent situations and challenges using their philosophical tools. As Santiago Amaya wrote about philosophy in Colombia 

You’ve probably heard about the Colombian peace process. (If you haven’t, please take a break from reading philosophy blogs and read some real news.) It started in 2012, reached a peace agreement in 2016, and is bringing to an end a 50-year conflict between FARC and the Colombian government. Today we’re going through the process of its implementation. In political terms, it’s been a struggle: war is profitable business for politicians. In philosophical terms, it’s been a Socratic dream.

The thirst of students in countries across the globe for philosophical thinking and for new ideas to help undergird societal changes convinces me that solidarity between philosophers, globally, and collaborations, are not just a matter of justice but also of urgency.

[minor edits for typos--thank you to those who pointed them out!] 

Comments

[Jen]

Marcus, you haven't honed in on Singer's most important reason for engaging the work he engages. The reason is that the work Singer engages has the benefit of being produced in our system. The "insiders," those who contribute to our system as editors, reviewers, teachers, mentors, etc., contribute to the quality of the work produced in the system. Work produced outside this system does not benefit from it (and this work includes much of the work produced in the anglophone west). And the benefit is significant enough that Singer believes outside work is likely not worth engaging. If this is his reason, nothing you have argued speaks against his reason.
Assuming I'm correct about Singer's reason, is his reason any good? It probably is. The "insiders" (editors, reviewers, etc. in our system) very likely receive training very different from the training of "outsiders." It is a difference in content and in quality. For this reason, since there is so much work available to engage, including that of insiders and of outsiders, it makes sense to view the work of outsiders as unlikely to be sufficiently worth engaging.
Is there a problem with this? Maybe so. But Singer's reason is not problematic. And so his decision to engage the work of insiders is not problematic. Instead, the system's being inaccessible to many is a problem. In a more just society, the system would be available to everyone.

[Jen]

Sorry, that was meant to be addressed to Helen, I guess.

[Jen]

And for what it's worth, I wouldn't be surprised if readers find dubious the claim that our system tends to produce better work than that produced outside it. But work produced by and because of people like Gideon Rosen tends to be better than work produced by or because of people at unknown colleges/universities. If this is not obviously true to readers, I'm not sure what to say to them. My guess is that understanding why it is better is easier when you've been trained within the system. And those who don't have the training tend to be incapable of understanding. My mother doesn't understand why her way of "knowing" the truth, which involves interpreting insight gleened from her dreams, is not better than mine, which involves scientific methodology. I cannot help her to understand because she doesn't understand scientific methodology and its merits. So I don't try.

[Helen De Cruz]

Jen, yes should be addressed to me. I want to push back against conflating the fact that people trained at universities like mine (well-funded, well-networked etc), "insiders" can write in such a way that their papers find the way to publication with some sort of quality all things considered. It is tricky to do this well. Grad students at research-oriented universities take years to master this skill, which we already offer building blocks as undergrads.
However, it is also the case that a lot of philosophy produced in these top venues is unoriginal and boring. It's written competently, for sure, but there is little in the way of new ideas, it's basically (to use a tired metaphor) building new epicycles within discussions that already have narrowed considerably all we can say about a given topic. Take any topic you like, you'll see very early in the discussion the tone is set by a few prestigious players, for example, Williamson and Stanley on skill--you can think of so many things re skill and whether it can be reduced to knowledge-that and can be Gettiered is only a tiny aspect of it, but it got a lot of attention in the early 2000s. Because more intrinsically interesting? I do not think so, it's because of dynamics of the credit economy in our system. I say this btw with the greatest respect for both authors. I love their work on this, and have cited it and taught it. But the conversation cannot end there!

So we do have a problem that outsiders lack the resources and skills that would allow them to be part of the conversation. I think once they do (and we need to think together on how to facilitate this--proposals welcome!) we will see that the influx of new ideas will transform academic philosophy, will give us so many new exciting ideas to think about, and will enrich us. For example, if you take ubuntu as a concept, rather than Rawlsian agents behind the veil of ignorance, that is people who are situated, local etc., then you'll find different concepts of justice arise. Such concepts are interesting and worthy of philosophical discussion, and we are missing out that they are not more centrally part of the conversation.

[Jen]

Helen, thanks for responding. But just to be clear, I'm not claiming that someone's work being published within the system (or that a writer's ability to find a way to publish work within it) is sufficient for the work being of a high quality. The claim implies that any work published within the system is of a high quality. I deny this implication. (I agree with you, lot's of work published within the system is not of a high quality.) Rather, I'm claiming that a work's being published within the system tends to benefit the work, making it more likely to be sufficiently worth engaging.

One way that work produced within the system tends to be benefitted in accord with my suggestion is that its argumentative structure tends to be clearer (in that the underlying logic is clearer) than it otherwise would be. Clear argumentative structure is conducive to the production of knowledge and understanding. In this way, work produced within the system is more likely to be worth my engagement than work produced outside it. Other tendencies toward benefit can be explained. I need not explain them all.

[Helen De Cruz]

Ah I see, Jen. Yes I don't disagree. Making your work adherent to disciplinary standards is a great benefit. It facilitates discussion and the kind of open forum that allows for transformative criticism as Helen Longino explained it goes two ways--a work in, say, African philosophy that is published in Phil Review has huge potential to transform the field.
One reason that this doesn't happen (or not frequently) is that these journals are genuinely less open to lesser-taught philosophies, even those that adhere to all the standards. But another reason is that people who are in an optimal position to write about lesser-taught philosophies, especially contemporary ones, are not trained in such a way that their papers have any chance at being accepted in these venues.
I know from people in other fields, e.g., mathematics, physics, psychology that is an issue (together with funding, also a factor in philosophy). So one thing one might want to do is facilitate this kind of engagement--the main initiatives I am aware of are sporadic fellowships, PhD positions etc (for instance, King's College I believe is now advertising specifically PhD positions from people who live in African countries to come to the UK and do a PhD), and there is also an initiative by Yujin Nagasawa on training on writing journal articles in the pipeline. But there is generally not much, and I think we have a duty to reach out more actively. I'm not entirely sure how! I hope this blogpost can start a conversation

[Jen]

I'm glad we seem to be in agreement. But I really don't care about disciplinary standards or norms. I care about what makes sense and about what I can make sense of. I once read some prominent work on race and racism, work outside of philosophy. It was full of nonsense arguments, nonsense definitions, etc. It certainly didn't adhere to our disciplinary standards or norms. And it was not worthy of my engagement, but not because it didn't adhere to those standards or norms. It was because it was nonsense. Maybe I'm arrogant, or rather, maybe I simply value my time and effort.

Anyway, I agree that many of the best journals are not interested in lesser-taught philosophies, and that those in a position to write about those philosophies are not trained in such a way that they can publish in those journals. This is a problem to the extent that those philosophies are worthy of our engagement. With this in mind, I can imagine someone asking: if we cannot know that those philosophies are worthy of engagement because we don't have access to work that demonstrates their worth, what reason could there be to bother actively reaching out? And aren't there so many countervailing reasons to do known-to-be-worthwhile things? What duty to actively reach out could there be?

[Mohist]

Thanks Helen, this is a great post. I support your call for philosophers in wealthy countries to engage more with philosophers from the global south.

I work in an elite institution in a wealthy Asian country and my career progression requires me to publish in elite venues and engage with scholars at elite institutions. Yet I am also turned off by the elitism and prestige bias at these places. For this reason (and other reasons) I have taken the opportunity to attend several philosophy conferences in various "global south" countries in my region. In each instance I have found attending these conferences to be enriching. It is true that the average standard of scholarship is much lower than at more elite conferences in wealthy countries. But that doesn't stop me getting a lot out of them. I also find that, among the young people I meet, there are many who are intellectually impressive, and seem to have great philosophical potential (by contrast, the older people I meet tend to be less impressive, more stuffy, and more caught up in local hierarchies that elevate their status). This has led me to believe that in the decades to come we will see more and more of these brilliant, intellectually hungry, young people from the global south become significant scholars in philosophy and other academic disciplines.

By the way, I don't understand why you put this blatant straw person against effective altruism in your otherwise excellent and well argued post:

"It will simply not do for western outsiders to make a quick and easy effectively altruist calculation of the ideal dosage and distribution of insecticide, at least not in the long term, as this is a stopgap measure."

This is not the kind of thinking that EA is based on. Go to the main EA websites and you will find extensive, thoughtful, and rigorous discussion of the relative merits of short-term vs. long-term strategies for addressing problems like the one you discuss.

[Helen De Cruz]

Hi Mohist - yes you're right this is not a nuanced representation of effective altruism, but my general point still stands, that if we want to be effectively altruist that it is important to involve local stakeholders. Moreover, a wide, rich range of philosophical positions also helps us to get a better picture of how well effective altruism fares against these alternatives, much better than if we just looked at the standard western fare. (your pseudonym, for instance, already indicates one such philosophical position, interestingly similar and different to effective altruism!)

[pgs]

I'd suggest to check the use of conservation and conversation; while it maybe a stupid typo fuckup, it confuses the readers to no end

[James]

"The sentiment is that philosophers from the global south are not really worth engaging with, because their work would not be at the same level as the more prestigious, well-known (mostly white and male) philosophers from wealthy countries."

Helen with respect I don't believe that it was the sentiment Singer conveyed. The sentiment was that such contributions are not platformed in an accessible way to Singer in his limited circles, which relates to his education and the limitations of the period his career was in.

Do African's or any other cultures have less to contribute? Of course not, Singer was not saying that. What Singer said was he was subordinate to the timeframe in which he lived, the power structures of which facilitated overwhelming white male influence, so the ideas he referenced along the way had those origins. Of course, we might say well the same could be said for the actions of a German working within the Nazi regime - therefore, no excuse. However, this is Peter Singer! Of all people, if any contribution from elsewhere was available surely he would have referenced such ideas. Singer literally identified our ethical obligations to 'non-human animals'... Should Singer have got on a plane in the 1970s and travelled to Africa for years of translation and study to ensure a balance? Surely not, and nor should he now have to at his ripe old age.

I am with your plight, but better care is needed in picking the battles. Whilst a lot of our WW2 grandparents are still very, very racist and there is nothing we can do about changing their minds, Singer was against that tide! At best, this is a bad example of the new left trying to out left the old left. Surely there are bigger fish out there.

[Nicolas Delon]

What I don't understand is why Singer simply didn't deny the premise. He does work with, cite and engage with non-Western and non-white authors, as well of course as women. Many of the people who are lashing at him don't (and 99% of those people have not suggested a single author they think Singer should have cited but did not). Could he do more? Of course! He doesn't have the most diverse bibliographies in the world. But so could we all do better. At the same time, I haven't launched a global movement to help the global poor and sentient creatures, so I don't feel super comfortable telling him to do more.

[Helen De Cruz]

James, the piece was--as I point out at the start of it--meant as a broader reflection for us as a field. I think what Singer is saying reflects a broader sentiment, specifically

"If you’re thinking of the work of Africans, for example, I don’t know the work of many of them that is really in the same sort of—I’m not quite sure how to put this—participating in the same discussion as the people you’ve just mentioned."

Now Singer has meanwhile clarified what he means on a Daily Nous post. But this still does not take away from the fact that as a field we are not structured in a way that we can benefit from global philosophical conversation.

Singer says this has to do with his environment and education, and that's fine as it goes, still I think as a field we must do better because it is important to talk to stakeholders in the conversations about issues of global and local concern.

On a related note, I appreciate Peter Singer's engagement on the Daily Nous and I hope we get some conversation going on lesser-taught philosophers.

I am not interested in culture wars, or left against right, so I am not sure what your remark at the end means (I do not feel I fit politically in any of the streams and certainly not in a Manichean culture war as we are seeing in the US and in other western English-speaking countries. I am interested in constructive conversation.)

[Helen De Cruz]

pgs - thanks! A simple repeat typo (I'm sorry I'm not a great proofreader. I've now corrected it and put at the bottom of the page that the minor edits were made)

[Helen De Cruz]

Nicolas, as you point out the problem is really part of our field. Indeed, even if Peter Singer cited and collaborated more (than he does already nw) with authors outside of the anglophone west, this would not solve the structural issues I pointed at above namely that the most prestigious venues (journals, conferences, monographs) structurally exclude philosophers working across the globe, who have relevant and interesting things to say, and that could be of benefit to all. Individual efforts to cite etc more will only bring us so far, since the problems in the field reflect broader socio-economic inequities, that would require creative and structural solutions to at least mitigate in the domain of philosophy.

[Nicolas Delon]

Thanks for the reply, Helen. I agree with most of what you say, in particular with shifting the focus away from Singer personally onto the structural issue.

[Patrick S. O'Donnell]

I am not able to post at Daily Nous (where there is another thread about this), perhaps because I am not a professional philosopher, but I think Singer, and a few interlocutors to this conversation might find this useful: https://www.academia.edu/46923618/Thinking_about_Comparative_Philosophy_a_short_bibliographic_introduction