The Philosophers' Cocoon

Summer sounds

AOS, job-types, and placement: a hypothesis

Several weeks ago, I shared some interesting findings that Jonathan Weisberg (Toronto) compiled on academic job-placement. Weisberg has since updated his findings, including the following figures:

One thing that Weisberg didn't include in either of these figures is unranked programs. However, he did report findings for them, and the findings he reported are really interesting. Although he found unranked programs in general had only a 29% tt-placement rate (on par with the lowest-Leiter-ranked programs above), some unranked programs had TT placement rates well above many of the highest Leiter-ranked programs:

PROGRAM	N			TT	PHD	PGR
The Catholic University of America	11			0.91	0.18	0
Baylor University	13			0.85	0.08	0
DePaul University	11			0.82	0.09	0
University of Tennessee	13			0.77	0.00	0
University of New Mexico	7			0.71	0.00	0
Vanderbilt University	9			0.67	0.00	0
University of South Florida	15			0.60	0.00	0
Florida State University	12			0.58	0.08	0
University of Oregon	12			0.58	0.00	0
University of Kansas	9			0.56	0.00	0

For what it's worth, the above findings as a whole seem to me to fit reasonably well with the hypothesis I floated several years ago: namely, that candidates from lower-Leiter-ranked programs (well, at least some of them) may have the most difficult time getting tenure-track jobs--due to them producing research-focused candidates who may be poorly-positioned to compete for research jobs or jobs at teaching institutions. For notice what the above unranked programs are doing: these programs aren't placing their candidates into R1 programs (with PhDs or Leiter-rank). They are instead placing 56-91% of their recent PhDs into TT positions at teaching institutions. Unranked institutions that focus in niche areas (Continental, Religion) and/or prepare their students as teachers seem to vastly outperform many (if not all) lower-ranked Leiter programs when it comes to placement.

Anyway, this got me thinking about the final figure that Weisberg posted:

The thing that is the most striking to me about this chart is the extreme variance of TT placement-rates the further one moves down the Leiter-rankings. Up toward the top of the scale, MIT and Pittsburgh are the only real outliers. Down between 2 and 3.25, on the other hand (which correspond to programs ranked 25-50 in the Gourmet Report), the variance explodes. For instance UC Riverside (ranked 32) places over 70% of its candidates in TT jobs, whereas Maryland (ranked above Riverside in 2006, which is Weisberg's focus) was found to place not even 20% in TT jobs. 

What accounts for these disparities? It could be a variety of things, of course. But let me hazard a hypothesis about something that might be going on: some kind of interaction between AOS, PhD program-rank, and TT placement. Let me explain. I have worked at a mid-sized liberal arts institution for ten years now. When I started here, my department only had two tenure-track philosophy faculty: one focusing in Asian Philosophy and one in Aesthetics (hired decades ago). The latter faculty member is now several years retired. Today, my department has five full-time faculty who focus in the following areas:

1. Asian Philosophy
2. Ethics and Social-Political
3. Feminist Philosophy
4. Philosophy of Race
5. Applied Ethics

Notice anything interesting? We do not have any full-time (let alone tenure-track) faculty in the department whose areas of primary focus are "core" areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of mind, etc. Not a single one. It's not that we wouldn't like full-time, tenure-track philosophy in these areas. We would love it. It is just that these are not high-demand hiring areas at an institution like mine. I could go into some detail as to why this might be. In brief, I think it's probably a combination of two things. First, metaphysics, epistemology, language, logic, and other core areas don't tend to draw students. Second, insofar as just about everyone is trained in 'core areas' in grad school (in my day, we all had to take proseminars and other coursework in 'core' areas), we just don't need specialists to teach the only kinds of courses we need to offer in those areas: namely, lower introductory-level courses. In brief, although maybe things could change if our university continues to grow (and we have grown rapidly), it appears to be highly unlikely that we will do a tenure-track hire in core areas in the foreseeable future (side-note: I think similar issues make it comparatively unlikely that schools like mine will do hires in philosophy of science).

I suspect many other liberal arts institutions are not unlike mine in this regard. But now notice what this means: if you choose any 'core' areas as your AOS while in graduate school, this means that the vast majority of jobs hiring in your area will probably not be at schools like mine. Rather, the kinds of schools that hire in 'core' areas will be R1 universities. But now which kind of candidate is going to be the most competitive for those jobs, all things being equal? Answer: not candidates coming out of lower-Leiter-ranked programs. No, insofar as 'core' areas are often regarded as especially prestigious areas of philosophy (look at places like Rutgers and NYU), the kind of candidate far and away most likely to be competitive for 'core' jobs at R1's will be those coming out of top-10 programs. If this hypothesis is right, then if you are a grad student, your choice of AOS may have immense implications for your competitiveness. If you are in a top-10 program, then choosing metaphysics or epistemology as an AOS may be a fine choice. But if you are in a lower-ranked program? It may well be the worst choice you can make: one that may make you uncompetitive for any job (since you may be unable to compete well for R1 jobs and there simply aren't many 'teaching' jobs in those areas).

Anyway, I don't know if this hypothesis is true. But I suspect there is something to it. So I took a look at a few department pages. Here is what Riverside's grad program page says (my bold):

The Philosophy Department at UC Riverside is a nationally ranked program with a genuinely pluralistic emphasis.We have strengths in specific areas of analytic philosophy, 19th and 20th century European philosophy, and the history of philosophy (especially eighteenth and nineteenth century).

What is striking about Riverside's program, in other words, is that it has strengths in niche areas. If my above hypothesis is true, this may go a long way to explaining their program's high-levels of success in TT-placement. Here, in contrast, is Maryland's grad program page:

The Department offers a graduate program leading to the PhD degree as well as a terminal MA. The faculty have a wide range of interests throughout contemporary analytic philosophy, with special strengths in the following areas:

• Aesthetics
• Moral and Political Philosophy
• Philosophical Logic
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Science

I don't mean to cast aspersions on Maryland's program in any way. They may be a great program. But notice the difference. As I expect we all know, basically nobody hires in Aesthetics. This means that of the remaining five areas Maryland lists as strengths, four are 'core' areas. If my above hypothesis is true, this may go a ways to explaining why Weisberg found Maryland's placement rate to be so much lower than comparative programs. Finally, while I did not do anything like an exhaustive survey, I did look at several other outliers and broadly found similar things (that lower-ranked programs with strong placement rates appeared to have strengths in niche areas, whereas those with weaker placement rates seemed more focused in 'core' areas).

Anyway, at this point, this is just a hypothesis. But I think it is one worth considering and investigating further--as it may be vital for grad students to understand, at least if they want to make wise decisions about what to specialize in to be competitive on the academic job-market given the type of program they are coming out of.

Listing job-talks on a CV?

In our newest "Ask a search-committee member" thread, Anon writes: Sorry if this has been answered before: should you list previous job talks (from campus visits) in your CV?

My sense is that quite a few job-candidates do this, but every time I have seen it discussed, the consensus answer has been: no, absolutely not. Further, this answer actually seems to me a no-brainer. Job-talks are not 'invited talks.' They are a part of a formal job-interview. Would you list all of the schools you interviewed at on your CV? If you were working outside of academia, would you list on your CV that you have interviewed at places like Google, Apple, and so on? Of course not (or at least I hope not!). My sense is that all that listing job-talks on a CV is likely to do is make you come across as a bit of a show-off (like, "Ha, look at all of my interviews!). Even if that's not what you intend, I don't think that's a look you want to go for. Now, I realize as a candidate you might want to fill out your CV, especially if it's a bit on the short side. However, I still don't think listing job-talks is a good idea. On the one hand, if you listed them in their own category (under the heading of 'job-talks'), that would just look bizarre. On the other hand, if you list them under 'invited talks', you look like you don't know what an invited talk is--as again, job-interviews just aren't 'invited talks': they're interviews. 

Anyway, maybe I'm wrong about all of this. If other people who have served on search committees see things differently, feel free to say so. But, for my part, I'd be very surprised if there turned out to be significant disagreement among search-committee members on this. To me, it seems like one of those obvious "don'ts" (like listing papers merely under review under 'publications', something which, alas, I've heard many candidates do too!).

Listing impact on CVs?

In the comments section of our "Ask a search-committee member" thread, I posed the following query:

... I recently heard a job-marketeer [ask] on social media...whether candidates with significant citation counts (viz. Google Scholar) or download numbers (at Philpapers, SSRN, etc.) should put these things on their CV. I recall the person suggesting it might be helpful, as it would provide search committees with evidence of scholarly impact (that they might not otherwise be aware of). But I also vaguely recall people discouraging the person from doing it. I think it might be good to hear from actual search-committee members what they think about this.

I'm actually really curious about this. Although my memory is hazy, I seem to recall most people suggesting that the job-marketeer not put this kind information on their CV. However, this seems strange to me...

Admitting 'wildcards' into grad programs?

I assume at least some of you have seen Eric Schwitzgebel's recent update to his 2007 series on applying to grad programs in philosophy. As many other philosophers have remarked on social media, some of the information Schwitzgebel shares is remarkable. Consider:

Looking at data on eight of our eleven admittees [at UC Riverside] this year (excluding one international applicant whose transcripts aren't comparable and two who quickly declined UCR for higher ranked programs), all but one had GPAs over 3.85 at their most recent institution, with a median GPA of 3.92/4.00. While it's not impossible to be admitted to a mid-ranked PhD program without stellar grades, it is rare. If you are applying as an undergraduate or M.A. student, you want straight As, or very close, in your upper-division philosophy classes. 

Many of my philosopher-friends on social media--many of whom are very successful and well-published--have remarked how, given the above numbers, they would almost certainly be rejected by such programs today. For my part, I had a 3.6 coming out of my undergrad at Tufts. Other friends of mine online noted that they got into philosophy grad programs with undergrad GPA's as low as a 2.7. Presumably, me and many other people who I've seen comment online would never be admitted to good programs with these kinds of numbers today. And I will be honest: this concerns me. Let me explain.

Publications in edited volumes & the market

A reader writes in:

I was wondering if I could get The Cocoon's response to the following couple of questions: 

1) Is a single publication in an edited volume (put out by a good press) better than no publications at all when heading onto the market (assuming you also do have some stuff out and under view)? 

2) What is a hiring committees perception of a graduate student who has a paper in an edited volume?

I figure the answer to 1) is obviously "yes," so I guess 2) is the more important question. 

One comment before I leave you to it: I have heard people say that edited volumes are where good publications go to die, which I think is silly. I work primarily in the history of philosophy, and I often find that essays in edited volumes are much more interesting than essays in journals, since in journals you mostly find articles of the form "X said this Aristotle on motivation, Z said this on Aristotle on motivation, here I come, Y, and I will say this." Whereas in volumes, you find work that is exploring neglected views, or just taking some risks. In any case, I guess there is the worry that hiring committees might ask themselves: "If this is a publishable paper, why isn't it in a journal?" The answer is often: because it grew out of a conference that had a book contracted for the talks. But still, I could see this question arising. 

Good questions. Although this data is seven years old now, my sense has long been that candidates coming out of top programs don't necessarily need any publications in order to get a TT job (has this changed?). Indeed, when I was in grad school, the word on the street was that it was actually better to have no publications coming out of a top program than publications in "weak" venues. So, I'm not sure having a publication in an edited volume is better than nothing, at least for candidates coming from top-ranked programs. For other candidates, I think a publication in an edited volume probably is better than nothing. Indeed, having served on four hiring committees now, I can attest to this. However, even here I think there are several important caveats to bear in mind.

Pitching 'narrow' AOS's to search committees

In our newest "Ask a search committee member" thread, 'early career anon' writes:

If an applicant has chosen to work in a number of different areas of interest and is less specialized in one particular AOS than other candidates, how should they go about presenting that in the best light to search committees?

Although it's not entirely clear to me what 'early career' means here, I take it the case may be something like this. Suppose one's primary research programs are on free will, philosophy of perception, and vagueness--a number of different areas not unified under a single AOS. In that case, I assume one may list one's AOS as "Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language." However, one's actual areas of research are much narrower than those broad categories suggest. If one is applying to, say, a job ad in Metaphysics, one will come across as 'less specialized in Metaphysics' than many other candidates (since one only does one thing in that area, free will). Assuming this is the kind of case 'early anon' is concerned about, how should a candidate like this pitch themselves?

Query on book presses

In the comment thread on our recent post on seeking book contracts, Anon wrote:

In this thread there have been a few mentions of press rankings - well regarded, less well regarded, potentially a scam, etc.

I myself have much less of a sense of this than I do for journal rankings - would anyone be willing to share a rough list, in the sense of, "This wouldn't be a bad place to publish a book"?

In response, 'A book author' wrote:

Look at your own book collection in philosophy, and look at the most common presses. Those are the ones you should aim to publish with.
OR
look at the books you referred to in your dissertation, and look who published them. Do a count. Aim to publish with the two or three most common cited publishers.

As I wrote in a follow-up, I disagree. Over the years, Leiter has run a few polls on book presses (in English). I don't know a few of the presses listed in those polls (Continuum or Ashgate), but otherwise all of the presses listed in those polls strike me as decent presses to publish with. Obviously, publishing in the top 3 presses is ideal--at least in terms of getting one's book read and engaged with (and prestige, if one is concerned with that). However, many good books have been published over the years at other presses, and I've seen more than a few authors "work their way up" from lower-ranked presses to higher-ranked ones. 

Anyway, these are just my thoughts. What are yours, especially those of you who have published books?

Against referee-proofing one's papers

There are many ways to write a paper. Philosophy would be boring if that weren't the case. 

Still, I want to register a worry about what I think is an unproductive trend in how people write papers, that is, the increased tendency to "referee-proof" them, addressing all sorts of worries and concerns potential referees might have. I see this more and more in papers I'm refereeing. I used to assume those papers had been through review before, but I think authors are doing it pre-emptively now. I also see referee-proofing offered as explicit advice on how to get one's stuff published. For example, in a recent article on this blog on how to get published Marcus Arvan writes: 

Finally, I worked on referee-proofing articles, as I found through a lot of trial and error that one really does need to try to foresee and head off "every possible objection" referees can raise to a piece--as, in my experience, if an objection is reasonably foreseeable, some referee will raise it, and it might just be the objection that (if you don't address it) leaves them unconvinced enough to recommend publication.

It's obviously a good idea to write in such a way that readers do not misunderstand you and that you make your claim as clearly as possible. There's nothing wrong with referee-proofing in that weaker sense. 

But I question whether it's advisable or even possible to referee-proof in the stronger sense of heading off every possible objection, as Marcus supposes, so I will here gently and in the spirit of constructive dialogue (I think!) register my disagreement with him. Here are my reasons why I think referee-proofing is not advisable.

1. As you referee-proof, you sacrifice space to flesh out your position 

One wants to get published and maybe the chance increases due to referee-proofing. Still, referee-proofing is not without cost and one cost is the space one has to devote to head off objections of imagined referees rather than carefully staking out the position.

As an example, here are two papers I wrote (both written while I was not on the tenure track). They aren't refereed proofed at all yet got into decent journals, this one in Australasian Journal of Philosophy on origins of philosophical intuitions and this one in Philosophers' Imprint on mathematical realism and the evolutionary origins of maths. I spend practically no time in responding to potential objections, because I want to flesh out the positions I defend there in detail. The time you spend replying to imagined and projected (not actual) objections is time you do not have to develop your position in detail, which readers can then assess and respond to.

Obviously, both papers do take into account certain objections that actual people gave (actual referees, the editors of both journals, friends who read earlier drafts, audiences at conferences etc etc) but I did not try to imagine all possible reasonable objections for myself. This was particularly important for the AJP paper, as the journal has a fairly strict word count policy (at least upon initial submission). PI has more freedom in this respect, but one still tries to keep the word count manageable. I really wanted to flesh out the positions in as much detail as reasonable word count allowed. The platonism paper required numerous references to empirical literature to do so, as well as detailed engagement to Justin Clarke-Doane's evolutionary anti-realism about mathematics. I could not do that and also respond to imagined referee objections while keeping these papers manageably short. 

2. Can we anticipate objections of potential referees?

The fact that two referee reports will often have very different objections/concerns indicates that it is hard to anticipate which objections referees might have. Alone with one's own thoughts, one cannot obtain the required epistemic friction that's caused by interactions with actual people who are responding to one's ideas (see Medina on getting out of one's comfort zone by interaction with actual people and situations).

I'm not saying it cannot be done. Thomas Aquinas' Summa theologia (random sample here) is a nice example of careful addressing of potential concerns. It is also very long. In sum, we risk either picking out some objections that our audience doesn't necessarily care about or  end up with a very long, exhaustive list of objections. 

 

How do search committees read files?

In our new "ask a search committee member" thread, Tom writes:

What do *you* read first in a file? What don’t you read at all? Do you even *have* a systematic way of going through files, or is it haphazard/varying/based on how much you’ve been drinking?

(My expectation is that the answers to these questions will be wildly different from SC-member to SC-member, so I’m more interested in the diversity of answers than any particular answer.)

Great questions. I expect it might benefit job-marketeers tremendously to hear answers. In the comments section of the above thread, 'One person' replied:

I read material in roughly, the following order: the application letter (some people already show they were not appropriate for the job in the letter), the c.v. (here one gets an overview of the candidate and their accomplishments and qualifications - it is the most useful piece of information), then the rest. The teaching material gives a sense of their teaching, supported by a teaching letter; letters are looked at, but with some degree of skepticism, as there is lots of inflation; the writing sample may be looked at then. Then if they have some sort of research statement outlining future plans - this is useful for when you choose who to bring to campus as point of discussion.

My own practices are fairly similar. I always read CV's first, as to me they are the most informative on the whole, especially when it comes to deciding whether the person meets the minimum requirements for the job. The very first things I look at are the person's listed AOS and AOC.

Grappling with unconvinced reviewers

A reader writes in:

Lately I've received a lot of journal rejections with referee reports which basically read: "This is a tightly argued paper that makes some interesting points, but ultimately I wasn't convinced. So I can't recommend publication at this time. Let me now list a few of my minor objections." What I'm hoping to get is practical advice on how to work around these bad reports. It is impossible to write a paper for which objections can't be thought up. So what are realistic strategies? Write obscurely so they are harder to think up? Just send out a high enough volume of papers to enough journals so that by luck I hit a few referees who read my submission on a good day? Suddenly become a famous philosophy so the referees let my work pass just on name alone? If the bar is that I convince an average philosopher that my paper is correct, publication is hopeless (or so it feels).

This is a good query. Earlier in my career, I felt similarly. As the rejections piled up, I grew hopeless. What was the solution? At one point, I reached out to two former grad-school colleagues who had a stunning amount of publishing success. I asked them independently, "What's your secret?" Even though by that time they worked at different universities, they both gave me more or less the same answer. They said (I paraphrase):

On Seeking Book Contracts

In this post, I wanted to talk about two different ways to go about seeking a contract for a monograph.

In the first way, one drafts an entire manuscript, polishes it, then writes up a book proposal and sends it out to publishers. If publishers are interested, they can request the full manuscript to send out to referees. If the referees are impressed, the publisher may offer a contract to the author. After the author revises the manuscript in light of referee comments, the book will likely go out for a final clearance review before publication.

In the second way, one writes up a book proposal with, perhaps, only a few chapters completed. The proposals, together with the sample chapters, are sent out to publishers, who decide whether to offer a contract on the basis of the proposal, rather than on the basis of a completed manuscript. As far as I know, most or all major academic publishers still require a clearance review of the final manuscript before publication.

Ask a search-committee member (June 2019)

Last June, I ran a new series, 'Ask a Search Committee Member'. The basic idea is similar to our "how can we help you?" threads, except that the explicit focus is on posing any burning job-market questions you have to search committee members. Last year, we received a number of really good queries. So, given that the main academic job-market cycle is just a few months away, I thought now might be a great time to run the series again!

Anyway, in the comments section below, please share any questions you have for search committee members. I will then write up a short post in reply (based on my experience on search committees), and then ask other people who have served on search committees to weigh in.

Fire away, the more questions the better! 

Job-Market Resources

Given that the main academic job-market cycle is just a couple of months away, I thought it might be good to alert the blog's newer readers to some of the Cocoon's job-market series:

• Job-Market Boot Camp
• Notes from Both Sides of the Market
• Secret Lives of Search Committees
• Ask a Search-Committee Member
• Alt-Ac Workshop

Readers should also feel free to note any job-market queries they have in the comments section below. We're here to help!

Against 'commonsense'

I was reading this review of Timothy Williamson’s new (introductory-level) book recently when I came across this striking remark: “philosophy, Williamson tells us, starts from common sense, that is, 'what most members in a society know' (p. 8)”. This sentiment should be familiar to anyone who does academic philosophy. During conference talks and in books and articles, one often hears the phrase “that seems counterintuitive” as a strike against an argument or theory. Yet although this appears to be a very common view—that philosophy should begin with and ‘answer to commonsense’—it really could not be further from my own conception of what philosophy should do or the methods it should involve.

My concerns about philosophy ‘starting with commonsense’ are partly rooted in history. To put it bluntly, commonsense has a terrible track record, both in the sciences and in philosophy. Begin with science. Here, we learn that Galileo was basically run out of town from the University of Pisa because his mechanistic philosophy contradicted the Aristotelian ‘commonsense’ of the time. (Cropper, pp. 5-6) Then of course there was Darwin, whose theory of evolution by natural selection was assailed by numerous critics as an assault on the ‘commonsensical’ idea that humans are unique, divine creations. (Clark, pp. 135-41) Then there was Einstein, whose theory of relativity was mocked by a number of eminent scientists—most famously Philip Lenard—for flouting the “simple, sound common sense” that space and time must be absolute. (Hillman et al., pp. 37, 55, 57) As physicist Sir Oliver Lodge once put it, relativity is just "repugnant to commonsense." (Brian, p. 102) Suffice it to say, all of these affairs (and many others) turned out to be a pretty bad look for commonsense. Throughout the history of science, commonsense has a pretty awful track record.

What about philosophy? Here, ‘commonsense’ hardly fares better. For example, in 17^th Century England, Sir Robert Filmer enjoyed widespread fame for defending the ‘commonsensical’ idea that God endowed kings with a divine right to rule. However, this ‘commonsense’ did not stand the test of time. Instead, it was John Locke’s heretical idea that all people have natural rights—contrary to the classist and religious prejudices of the time—that served to influence future political and philosophical thought. Similarly, if we go back much further, to ancient Greece, we find that Aristotle took it to be simple commonsense that some people are fit to be slaves; Pythagoras thought it simple commonsensical that one should not eat beans, look in a mirror beside a lamp, or worship without shoes on. (Baird, p. 16) And so on. What we find here, again—throughout philosophical history, as in scientific history—is that what one generation takes to be commonsense the next takes to be foolish prejudices.

This is illustrated perhaps nowhere better than in the neo-Platonist Thomas Taylor’s satirical response to Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman entitled, “A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes”—where Taylor satirically argues, ‘if women have rights, why not animals too?”. Yes, in Taylor's satire, we get the following gem, where Taylor openly mocks the idea of moral equality:

IT APPEARS AT FIRST SIGHT SOMEWHAT SINGULAR, that a moral truth of the highest importance, and most illustrious evidence, should have been utterly unknown to the ancients, and not yet fully perceived, and universally acknowledged, even in such an enlightened age as the present. The truth I allude to is, the equality of all things, with respect to their intrinsic and real dignity and worth.... (p. 5)

And thus much may suffice, for an historical proof, that brutes are equal to men. It only now remains (and this must be the province of some able hand) to demonstrate the same great truth in a similar manner, of vegetable, minerals, and even the most apparently contemptible clod of earth; that thus this sublime theory being copiously and accurately discussed, and its truth established by an indisputable series of facts, government may be entirely subverted, subordination abolished, and all things everywhere, and in every respect, be common to all. (p. 28)

Of course, Taylor and his followers thought that extending rights to animals was so obviously antithetical to commonsense that it sufficed to demonstrate the absurdity of extending equal rights to women--not to mention the basic principle most of us now take to be obvious: that everyone is entitled to equal moral concern.

More broadly, if we look at philosophical history, it’s simply not ‘commonsense’ theories that have survived the test of time. In their time, Thomas Reid and William Whewell—commonsense moral intuitionists—were considered leading moral philosophers. However, moral philosophers today hardly study or engage with them. Why? Because, as John Stuart Mill put it, in his time 'commonsense' was used to defend the divine right of monarchs, the superior status of aristocracy, and the power of the church. (Reeves, p. 164) Mill found this repugnant, arguing that, “the regeneration required, of man and society…can never be effected under the influence of a philosophy which makes opinions their own proof, and feelings their own justification.” (Ibid.) For Mill, ‘commonsense’ is little more than “an apparatus for converting…prevailing opinions, on matters of morality, into reasons for themselves” (p. 241).

I am with Mill, Hume, Patricia Churchland, Dan Dennett, and other naturalistically-inclined philosophers. I don’t think philosophy should be in the business of ‘beginning with’ or ‘answering to’ commonsense at all. Commonsense is often (usually, I’d say) mistaken. Our task should be to place philosophy on better evidential foundations than that--specifically, on the findings of natural science, or at least on the kinds of principles of theory-selection that govern scientific practice. I know that not everyone shares my enthusiasm for ‘natural philosophy.’ Still, for all that, I am increasingly inclined to think it’s the best way to ensure that philosophical arguments and speculation are rooted in facts rather than in ill-founded, regressive prejudices of 'commonsense'—the former of which the world, it seems, now needs as much as (if not more than) ever.

In any case, whenever I hear philosophers say things like, "That's counterintuitive", "That's a serious bullet to bite", or "commonsense dictates", my inclination is not to find a way to make philosophy consistent with commonsense, but instead to figure out whether--given the actual facts that can be posited consistent with sound principles of theory-selection--commonsense has any truth to it at all!

Query on Open Ed Resources

A reader wrote in:

I am not writing to become a contributor, but to offer a suggested topic that I (of course) hope would benefit me and others: experience using Open Educational Resources. 

There is a push at my institution to use and adopt them. It seems that the main development in this area is in science textbooks since they cost so much. But perhaps you could start a thread on experience with them in philosophy: what texts have people used/found and are they good?

This is a great query. I recently went to update my course text for Philosophy of Law, and found that the only recent textbook that meets my needs (in terms of offering the kind of content I am looking for) runs for $200(!). That's an absolutely exorbitant cost, one that seems unfair to visit upon students given all that they are already spending on higher ed. But I've sort of been at a loss when it comes to finding a more affordable book that offers anything remotely close to the material I care to teach.

So, Open Ed Resources sound like a great alternative. Yet they are not something I know much about. So it would be great to learn more. Do any of you have experience with Open Ed Resources? If so, what texts have you used/found to be good?

How to be a philosopher at large (John Wilkins)

Guest post by John Wilkins, University of Melbourne

I wanted to be a philosopher from my youth, but I was not able to get my PhD until my late 40s. I used to joke that my full-time employment in publishing was supporting my philosophy habit. This meant my chances of an employed career were minimal, and despite getting two postdoctoral fellowships, I was not able to establish a regular tenure-track career. So it goes, as Vonnegurt often said.

However, I was able to get positions at two universities as what Australians call an “associate” or “honorary” fellow. This meant that I am able to continue doing research and publishing so long as I have food and a roof (with internet), or as I call them, the ancillary necessities of life to doing philosophy. As I am a self-funded retiree, until the money runs out, I will continue to publish.

So here is my summary of how to be an unemployed philosopher.

There are several basics required:

1. Access to academic literature;
2. Outlets for your work;
3. Inspiration and criticism from peers.

Access to literature

My work deals mostly with historical literature of science, so I was able to access a range of increasingly digitised books and journals via public libraries such as the Bibiliothéque National de France, the British Library, and various other sources back in the 2000s. Now, of course, such material is broadly available through sites like archive.org, and various specialty sites (the Biodiversity Heritage Library is my favourite).

However, you can find almost any philosophical text you like, so long as it is published prior to the current copyright date cutoff (in the US, 1928 due to Mickey Mouse laws). This means that you can cite the original edition of Locke’s Essay or Hume’s Treatise or Enquiry.

Many journals have open access archives also. Since philosophy, more so than science, cites a large historical range, access to Mind or Noūs even if they are older publications is essential.

But one also needs to keep up with current work, and be able to search on topics to see what the state of play is now. For this, Google Scholar is central. Most philosophers’ papers are accessible through online manuscripts, or services like ResearchGate, which also allows readers to contact many researchers for PDFs of their work.

In the end, though, nothing beats access through a university library. This is where honorary status comes in. The university gets to claim the credit for your work in exchange for giving you library access (and often some other benefits). Contact your alma mater for information.

Outlets for your work

In order to be a good philosopher, one must engage with one’s peers. You also have to craft your arguments through teaching and engaging with up and coming philosophers. For this, you are best placed if you have some teaching engagement and the credentials to present at conferences, workshops and seminars.

Spring sounds

Query on research support

A reader writes in:

I was wondering whether you knew of any place where data is collected on what research support [mostly conference] is provided? I imagine that support runs the full gamut, especially depending upon the sorts of university involved. But I was hoping to find some actual data...If you happen to know of anything, that would be great!

It would be great to know things like how research intensive the job is, teaching load, public v private, grad program or no. (I wonder if it would also be helpful for people headed out on the job market next year--there seemed to be way more flexibility in asking for research money than in asking for salary money for me.)

This is a great query - one that might help job-candidates in negotiations and departments in advocating for increases. A while back, one of my social media acquaintances ran a thread where people volunteered information on how much conference support their university provides. And, if I recall, the numbers were all over the map. So, unless anyone has any actual hard data on this, I was thinking it might be good for readers to share information about their own case--namely:

1. How much research support your university provides (e.g. conference-travel funding, etc.).
2. Which kinds of research support is provided (just conference funding, or additional?)
3. The type of college or university you work at (public, private, grad program, undergrad only?).
4. Teaching load.

I'm really curious to see what people report!

Writing and Publishing at Teaching-Heavy Institutions

In today’s post, I wanted to take a look at research at teaching-heavy institutions. Before moving forward, I wanted to explain my motivation in writing this. First, as more and more job seekers seem to be taking an interest in colleges with heavy teaching loads, including two-year institutions, I thought hearing the views of someone at a heavily teaching-focused institution might be of some value. I also hoped to hear from others who teach at such colleges about their own experiences and views on writing.

I will organize this post around several questions that have arisen in discussions with other faculty at similar institutions or others who are seeking employment at these sorts of institutions.

First, a word on what I mean by teaching-heavy schools. I have in mind schools that both have a heavy teaching load (let's say, 4-4 or higher) and also see themselves (as reflected in tenure requirements, contract specifications, and culture) as concerned solely or almost solely with non-research requirements. If we think of colleges as falling along a spectrum, my own institution is firmly toward the teaching side. It transitioned from a 2-year institution to one offering 4-year degrees about a decade ago, but the requirements for faculty and the cultural norms have remained the same. The load is 5-5-2 (2 in the summer) and the tenure process involves significant scholarship of teaching and learning. (We must attend many pedagogy seminars and workshops, and we must submit about 300 pages of research examining elements of our teaching, but there is no push for anyone to publish any of it.) There are no research requirements for tenure or in our contracts other than the pedagogical writing we need to do for the tenure process. I know of other colleges with 4-4 loads that also require little or no research and involve lots of interaction with students outside of the classroom. I think of these as teaching-heavy as well.

What are the downsides for writing in this environment?

There are a few, I think. First, there is no pressure to publish, and for many of us (myself included) it is easy for writing to get pushed onto the back burner if there is no pressure. Second, it can be difficult to find others in our institutions who wish to be actively engaged in research. This can make those of us who wish to write feel a bit alone. Third, we tend to have smaller departments, and so have less opportunities for the sort of engaged philosophical discussion that can inspire writing projects. Fourth, at some of these institutions (certainly at mine), there is almost no opportunity to teach courses related to our research interests.

Choosing job-talk papers

In our newest "how can we help you?" thread, Anon writes:

About the paper that you focus a job talk around. Suppose you have something at every stage of the pipeline - including, say, a manuscript that's not quite submitted for review, a manuscript that's under review, a manuscript that got an R&R decision, a manuscript that you've revised and resubmitted, and a conditional acceptance.

Are any of these options clearly a bad idea? On the one hand, as we get towards the end of the list, they're more polished, and you'll presumably look better presenting them. But also, as we approach the end of the list, they're more "done", and you run the risk of looking like you don't have new things coming.

'One-Time Job Candidate' then answered:

Just my opinion here, but I think the choice of topic for a job talk depends a lot on where you are giving the talk. If it's at a place with a PhD program, I would choose something new, interesting, ambitious, that may not be as far along in the process.

But at teaching-oriented places, I think it's better to give a safer talk in the sense that it's on a better-known topic which is accessible to a lot of people. At least, this was my experience with the job talks I had a few months ago. All were at teaching-oriented places, and none of the talks were based on a paper. Rather, they were overviews of my research program as a whole, tying my work into recognized and accepted philosophical problems that everyone can appreciate.

It was clear that the audiences appreciated this, including the undergraduates in attendance.

I found this interesting, as I would have thought the opposite to be the case: that it would probably be best to present something very polished at research institutions (given the concern for rigor in research, particularly in Q&A's), and something more ambitious at teaching institutions (that might excite the faculty and undergrads there, even if not terribly polished). But this is just my off-the-cuff reaction, and I don't really have much to go on besides my experiences and One-Time Job Candidate's.

What do you all think, particularly those of you who have done well on the market or been on the hiring side of things?

Taking time off work/the market for motherhood?

In our newest "how can we help you?" thread, Anonymous writes:

Would it be career suicide to skip the job market and adjuncting for a year (or maybe even two) to expand my family and be a stay at home parent for a little while? I would still attempt to write, publish, and present at conferences (in fact I'd have much more time to attempt to do these things if I wasn't adjuncting and on the market while parenting a young child). I was on the market during my first pregnancy and adjuncted right up until my due date. I'm not keen to try that again while also parenting a toddler. I also don't want to put off having another kid until after I get a permanent job (since it may never happen anyway). Would schools consider hiring someone with this kind of gap in teaching? If so, would there be a good way to explain it in my cover letter and/or CV when going back on the market at a later time?

'B' then answered:

Make a point of listing it on your c.v. or in your letter that you were on maternity leave. There are civilized departments out there. Hopefully no one will ask you to show the placenta to prove it.

While I think this is right--and I think this is an important issue--I also think that whether Anonymous should bet on 'civilized departments' may be a difficult question to answer. Allow me to explain.

I have heard two things anecdotally from a number of people. The first is that search committees may have a tendency to look askance at 'gaps' in one's employment record. The second is that, at many places, there may be fairly clear discrimination against women on the basis of motherhood. For example, I have heard from women academics I know personally that things like the following have been said in their presence, "Oh, she just had a child. Say goodbye to her productivity." Not only that: there is plenty of empirical research showing a very real "motherhood penalty" in hiring and wages--whereas men actually appear to benefit in the workplace from being fathers (whereas motherhood is prejudicially associated with less productivity, fatherhood appears to be prejudicially associated with greater productivity).

If you put these two (very) unfortunate things together--the anecdotal possibility that hiring committees may hold 'employment gaps' against candidates, and real evidence that motherhood is used against mothers in hiring--then B's advice may, sadly, not be the best advice to follow (at least if Anonymous does not want to risk these things, as the concerns in her comment suggests she is concerned about). That being said, I am neither a father nor (obviously) a mother, so I cannot pretend to speak to Anonymous' situation beyond this.

What do you all think?

Representation in professional organizations

Updated: 7:10pm, 6/11/2019

Last week, the APA announced the results of its most recent elections. I think everyone elected is highly qualified and deserving of their new positions, and I congratulate them all wholeheartedly. Nevertheless, I would like to make a modest suggestion to the APA and other professional organizations about representation. To be clear in advance, the suggestion I will offer is not intended as a criticism. I appreciate what the APA does, and have benefited from it tremendously as a member. Further, a voluntary association, I think the APA is probably well within its moral rights to represent its members in the way it currently does and traditionally has. Rather, I merely want to make the positive suggestion that it might be good for the APA, the profession as a whole, and many of its members for it--and other professional organizations like it--to pay additional attention to some issues concerning representation. Allow me to explain.

Upon receiving the notification of the APA's election results, I quite naturally looked at who was elected. I was in turn pleasantly surprised that a number of people I voted for were elected--which made me happy, both for them and for the profession. However, I then noticed something interesting: that of the nineteen people elected, 18 are from research universities (the lone exception being Rebecca Copenhaver from Lewis and Clark College). Because I found this striking, I looked at the APA's Board of Officers page to see what the composition of its Board has been. When I went down the list of 26 people listed, I found that 23 officers work at research universities. Of the remaining three officers, two--Rebecca Copenhaver and Jeffrey S. Dunn--work at liberal arts universities, and the third (Matthew O'Brien) has a non-academic affiliation. In other words, across both pages I found that 41 of 45 the APA's officers, or 91.1%, are from research universities.

While I understand that research plays a central role in the discipline, this strikes me as potentially a missed opportunity in several respects.

Expectations about becoming a professor

Last week, I wrote a post answering a recent undergraduate's query about managing expectations heading into grad school. In brief, I suggested to 'Cautiously Optimistic' that they take a great deal of care not to let their cautious optimism morph into reckless optimism - as I have seen many a grad student (including myself!) become socialized in grad school to expect an academic career, and hence not take enough care to ensure they have a viable 'plan B' if an academic career doesn't work out.

In today's post, I want to address another part of Cautiously Optimistic's query that I didn't focus on the first time. In their query, they wrote: 

I have gotten a taste for academic life (as a TA, presenting in conferences, etc.), and I enjoy producing scholarship and am most interested in working with students. While in high school, I job shadowed professors (in music and in English), since the profession appealed to me. So I would like to be a professor. (my italics)

Here is what I would like to focus on: Cautiously Optimistic's desire to be a professor on the basis of their 'taste of academic life.' As I explain below, I think undergraduates and early-term grad students (i.e. MA students and PhD students before the dissertation stage) can and often do have dramatically inaccurate expectations about what is actually involved in becoming and being a professor--that is, a dramatically inaccurate 'taste' of what academic life is actually like. Allow me to explain.

Supporting Our Transgender Peers in Philosophy

After reading several accounts by transgender colleagues reporting very negative experiences in the profession--accounts that a number of other trans colleagues wrote on social media cohere with their own experiences--Helen and I commissioned the following guest post on ways to support our trans peers better. We hope the post will lead to constructive, supportive dialogue on this important issue - as we believe that our profession should be a welcoming and supportive place for all of its members, particularly those who have been marginalized and who experience the profession as less welcoming that it should be.

Although we recognize that recent discussions of these and surrounding issues have been very contentious, our aim in hosting this post and discussion is--in line with the Cocoon's safe and supportive mission--to provide a safe and supportive forum for constructive dialogue. Bearing this in mind, we will moderate discussion carefully, so as to ensure that discussion is constructive and conforms to this forum's mission. Many thanks to the co-authors of this piece for composing it, and for their work on these important issues!

Supporting Our Transgender Peers in Philosophy

By Isela González Vázquez, Jules Holroyd, and Rory Wilson

Department of Philosophy,  The University of Sheffield

Many of us will have been saddened to read the two pieces – here and here –  from trans students describing their experiences within academic philosophy. While we strongly disagree with the views of 'gender critical' philosophers, and are grateful to those who have engaged with their arguments, that's not what we want to do in this post. We don't want to add more fuel to the flames here. Instead, we want to ensure there is space to discuss the kinds of support we should be making available to trans staff and students. What we can do better? How can we, academic philosophers, cis and transgender, together support trans staff and students within our departments and within our discipline?

What It's Like to Be on the Philosophy Job Market: A Simulation

About a month ago, I gave a presentation to a group of graduate students about the philosophy job market. During that presentation, I showcased a short video that was designed to be a simulation of what it's like to go on the academic job market in philosophy. I think it's fair to say that it's not the most optimistic portrayal of how the job search can go. But given what was going on at the time I came up with this idea, that's probably not surprising. On the bright side, it did provide some use for the rejection notices that I had been accumulating over the past few years, and my search this past year was ultimately successful (though that story will have to wait for another post).

Anyway, I have now uploaded that short video to YouTube so that you can have the experience of going on the philosophy job market condensed into a mere 75 seconds. The video is embedded below, but I'd recommend full-screening it if you want to actually read some of the text. Note that all the rejection emails in the video are legitimate except one, and you'll probably be able to figure out which one that is.

Spring sounds

Still one of the best bands most people have never heard of.

More below the fold...

Query on transferring PhD programs

In our most recent "how can we help you?" thread, a reader writes:

Is there any specific advice about how to write your application for transferring Ph. D programs other than the obvious — don’t trash talk your old program, etc.?

I don't know, myself. I did transfer successfully from one program (Syracuse) to another (Arizona). But I don't recall doing anything special, aside from getting good letters from the faculty in the first program (who were supportive of my leaving, given that I was leaving in response to four of our professors--all of whom I planned to work with--being hired away by other programs over the course of a single year).

Aside from trying to get positive letters, though, I guess I only have one other piece of advice. When I applied to Arizona, I initially used a 'safe' but (I thought) clear and rigorous epistemology paper as my writing sample (one I had gotten an excellent grade on in a grad seminar). At one point, a member of the admissions committee (David Chalmers) asked me if I had any other writing samples to consider (perhaps because the committee was not too enthused with the first - though I don't know for sure). In response I sent a much more ambitious paper (on vagueness) as my second writing sample...and I was accepted into the program later that same day. So, for what it is worth, my sense then--and my sense now, based on my experiences on the academic job-market--is that people may be much more interested in ambitious rather than 'safe' work. But this, again, is just a hunch.

Anyway, that's all I have. Do you any of you have any helpful tips for someone interested in transferring PhD programs?

Confessions of a Skeptic About Teaching

The following post was submitted by an anonymous reader:

By Anonymous

This is an essay about teaching. But it's going to start with a discussion of driving, for the purpose of making an analogy.

About driving, I want to make the following four broad observations:

(1) It's important to drive well enough. That is, you should be able to drive safely, competently navigate your home city, etc. And it's important to be able to do this.

(2) One can take advanced driving courses and learn to do lots of cool things with cars. One can then try to apply these things to one's daily driving -- e.g. one might try to accelerate through curves in an optimal way, brake in a way that conserves fuel, etc. But really, once you can do an ok job driving (that is, once you can safely and competently get around -- something we think 16 year-olds can do) it's not particularly important to learn these other tricks.

(3) On the other hand, one might enjoy taking advanced driving courses and learning to do cool things with cars. Or, one might enjoy going on long drives. Both of these are perfectly good reasons to put more time into your driving. But they're not reasons why we all should do this. They're reasons why you might, for your own enjoyment, put more time into driving. If I don't do those things, though, this isn't some sort of failing on my part. Maybe I get my kicks out of reading poetry or mowing my lawn instead. You know -- different strokes and whatnot.

(4) If you are the sort who gets their kicks out of driving, you're also likely the sort who wants to go drive on tricky roads -- e.g. maybe you're in to off-roading, or you want to drive up treacherous switchbacking mountain passes, etc. What you probably don't do is just rave about and look forward to your daily commute, or to driving to the grocery store. That is, it's probably driving unusual and/or difficult roads, or making long drives that gets you going, not just ordinary old motoring.

Managing expectations approaching grad school

In our newest "how can we help you?" thread, Cautiously Optimistic writes:

I have just finished my undergraduate career and am soon to start my MA (a funded program). I have gotten a taste for academic life (as a TA, presenting in conferences, etc.), and I enjoy producing scholarship and am most interested in working with students. While in high school, I job shadowed professors (in music and in English), since the profession appealed to me. So I would like to be a professor. I have been told the healthiest approach is to go for it, manage my expectations, and have a good backup plan in the likely case it doesn’t work out. Any general advice as to how to manage your expectations, while not setting your heart on something that is acquired in large part through chance (rather than merit alone)?

This is a great query, and I will be curious to see how other readers respond. In brief, my suggestion would be to strongly guard oneself against unwarranted optimism - as I think unwarranted optimism can (and often does) lead people to not secure a good back-up plan while proceeding through grad school. Allow me to explain.

To promote one’s work, or not?

Updated: 2:50pm, 6/4/2019

In our newest "how can we help you?" thread, Anon writes:

Should I be trying to get people to notice my papers in some way other than just publishing and putting them out there? Cold emailing relevant interlocutors, posting about them in a public Facebook post, something like that?

I think these are great questions, one's I've wondered about on a number of occasions given the visibility the Cocoon provides. Here, in brief, are the conclusions I've come to: some people may look down on promoting one's work - but I think there is nothing to be ashamed of in doing it, and it probably benefits the profession and individuals who do it, at least on balance. Let me explain why.

Updated job-placement graph

Following this earlier information, Jonathan Weisberg (Toronto) has posted this new graph on academic job-placement:

As Amanda noted in our previous thread on this topic, Weisberg's data does not include the placement rates for hundreds of  'unranked' philosophy PhD programs (i.e. programs not in the Leiter rankings). This is important, because according to the ADPA Report the placement rates of some unranked programs are very high, indeed much higher in some cases than the most highly-Leiter-ranked programs (see here for a brief overview).

How can we help you? (June 2019)

It's been a couple of months since we've done one of these, so I figured now might be a good time for another one.

For those of you unfamiliar with this series, this is a chance for you to post openly or anonymously in the comments section below on anything you could use help with related to the profession. After you post your query in the comments section, I will then post new threads for readers to discuss your query.

Please feel free to ask questions on anything (within the Cocoon's mission) that you could use help with, including but not limited to:

• The job-market (applying for jobs, etc.)
• Graduate school
• Publishing
• Teaching
• Issues in the profession
• Work-life balance
• Personal struggles
• Etc.

Given that the job-market gets moving in a big way in just a few month, now might be a great time for first-time job seekers and other job-marketeers to ask any burning questions they have. Fire away - we're here to help! 

Drawing philosophical thought experiments

I've now finished my final drawing for a book under contract with OUP entitled Philosophy Illustrated, which fill feature line drawings of 42 thought experiments, and reflections written by experts.

What can make a visual artwork philosophical? 

By now, it is becoming increasingly well-established that fiction can be philosophical. Lots of speculative and other fiction is deeply philosophical, and stories were one of the ways in which philosophy used to be written. An early example is Ibn Tufail's Hayy ibn Yaqdhan‎, a philosophical novel which contains a rich long thought experiment of a boy who grows up on an island without culture or education and who learns, through his own experience, about the nature of physical reality and ultimately also about God. 

Eric Schwitzgebel argues here that stories can be philosophical. He writes: 

I reject the idea that philosophy is argument. If philosophy is argument, then Confucius's Analects is not philosophy, and the pre-Socratics' fragments are not philosophy, and the aphorisms of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are not philosophy. I say, instead: If an essay, or a parable, or a dialogue, or an aphorism, or a movie engages the reader toward new reflections on fundamental questions about meaning, value, the human condition, the nature of knowledge or art or morality or love or mentality, pushing us out of our settled and conventional ways of thinking, challenging us to explore and reconsider -- that's philosophy. Most real philosophy, as experienced by most people, takes the form of fiction.

If we can use a wide range of media to express philosophical thoughts, what would make a picture philosophical?

Obvious examples of philosophical visual artworks include the works by René Magritte, M.C. Escher, Salvador Dalí, Pablo Picasso and many more. For example, Magritte's Balcony (right) is a clear visual play on Manet's Balcony (left), but it is more than a crass memento mori where young beautiful people are replaced by coffins. As Magritte himself wrote about this work "For me the setting of The Balcony offered a suitable place to put coffins. The "mechanism" at work here might form the object of a learned explanation, which I am unable to provide. The explanation would be valid, indeed beyond question, but that would not make it any less mysterious. ”

Query on note-taking

A reader writes in:

What is the best way to develop a philosophy research journal, or commonplace book? I often find myself pulling from my annotated copies of peer-reviewed philosophy articles when I write. I would rather be drawing from notes of some kind, and verifying my citations in the final stages of my writing process. Unfortunately, when I try to develop a note-taking system for research purposes (for example, the twentieth-century 3-by-5 index card system for research papers) I become wildly inefficient. Should I just stick with my note-taking system of choice until I become efficient? Or should I be approaching this in a different way? Should I just continue researching without systematic note-taking? Is systematic note-taking a waste of time, contra the venerable Kate Turabian?

I don't know how other people would answer these questions, but for my part I don't take many notes. Instead, I have a carefully organized set of folders in my Google Drive where I catalog journal articles I've read, as well as piles of books on or next to my desk or on a bookshelf that I have read. Like this reader, I simply annotate what I've read: I scribble brief notes in book pages as I read, fold page-corners to remember where important things are, and jot brief notes in e-copies of journal articles. Then, when I draft new work (e.g. articles or books), I have a running memory of important things I know I've read, including a fair idea of where I read them. Then, as I write, I'll track down the relevant article in my Google Drive or fish the relevant book out of the pile next to my desk (or on my bookshelf), re-read relevant passages and my annotations. I think this method requires a pretty good memory--so I imagine taking detailed notes might work better for some people. Finally, on that note, sometimes I do jot down brief ideas in the 'notes' app in my iPhone, which I find helpful for remembering ideas I've had that might slip my mind later.

Anyway, that's what I do, and I guess I'd suggest to the reader if the annotating method works fairly well for them, they might as well stick to it. But that's just my offhand guess. What do you all do? Any advice for this reader?

Spring sounds

 

Job-market catastrophizing? It is not the only way

[EF: I discussed the blogpost "Job-market catastrophizing?: a conversation" with Krishna Del Toso, who continues to write and think as a philosopher but is no longer paid as one. He agreed to share his reflections below:]

Here's my two cents.

I must say that, as I see it, the root of the "catastrophizing" lies in the fact that as far as the academic work is concerned (whether it is philosophy, literature, physics etc.), you aren't totally in control of the effects of your choices, whereas in other domains you are. This condition that characterizes wannabe academics bring about two aspects: 1. you don't need to train the instant reactivity to external stimuli (I'm talking about the kind of reactivity that can make the difference between leading a business brilliantly… or not), 2. you enter a sort of vicious circle in which the "catastrophizing" is nothing but a passive, fruitless, element that nourishes, and is nourished by, the observation that things go as they go because of a sort of inviolable and tacitly admitted norm (kind of Heidegger's "das Man world").

Of course, I was myself in this very vicious circle when I was hoping (mind the word: hoping!!) for a position at the university, long ago, and I was wearing myself out of "I've never done enough", not to speak of the struggle for publications (a struggle often driven by the aim of adding an extra title in my cv: mere form, devoid of real substance… should research be like this? Definitely not!) and of the almost depressing waiting-time in the maybe-you’ll-be-the-next "parking lot" for researchers after a position. I was waiting for others to decide for me, and that, back then, looked quite obvious, normal.

Fortunately all this no longer wears me out, fortunately we live in a fast-changing world… and fortunately the Aristotelian saying, often remembered but rarely put into practice, according to which "being (and so philosophy too) can be said in many ways" remains always valid.

Now I'm bringing my knowledge of philosophy into non-strictly-philosophical fields, such as early-stage business (I'm currently working on a book on this subject) and personal growth (a colleague recently asked me to make together Youtube video conversations on this matter). The time to actualize the aforementioned Aristotelian message is ripe: consider that Google inaugurated the CPO position, Chief Philosophy Officer, not because it's cool but because they need philosophers. I also continue as an independent scholar with my research in the spare time, avoiding all boring stuff and focusing only on arguments that really tantalize me (of course now I write less articles than before, but they're published on the same international journals). But the most important aspect is that now I know (I mean, crystal clear awareness!) that if I work well, I pick up all the fruits of my actions because I damn deserve that, if I don't, the bad effects are entirely on me… because I damn deserve that. Such a huge relief!