Against 'commonsense'

I was reading this review of Timothy Williamson’s new (introductory-level) book recently when I came across this striking remark: “philosophy, Williamson tells us, starts from common sense, that is, 'what most members in a society know' (p. 8)”. This sentiment should be familiar to anyone who does academic philosophy. During conference talks and in books and articles, one often hears the phrase “that seems counterintuitive” as a strike against an argument or theory. Yet although this appears to be a very common view—that philosophy should begin with and ‘answer to commonsense’—it really could not be further from my own conception of what philosophy should do or the methods it should involve.

My concerns about philosophy ‘starting with commonsense’ are partly rooted in history. To put it bluntly, commonsense has a terrible track record, both in the sciences and in philosophy. Begin with science. Here, we learn that Galileo was basically run out of town from the University of Pisa because his mechanistic philosophy contradicted the Aristotelian ‘commonsense’ of the time. (Cropper, pp. 5-6) Then of course there was Darwin, whose theory of evolution by natural selection was assailed by numerous critics as an assault on the ‘commonsensical’ idea that humans are unique, divine creations. (Clark, pp. 135-41) Then there was Einstein, whose theory of relativity was mocked by a number of eminent scientists—most famously Philip Lenard—for flouting the “simple, sound common sense” that space and time must be absolute. (Hillman et al., pp. 37, 55, 57) As physicist Sir Oliver Lodge once put it, relativity is just "repugnant to commonsense." (Brian, p. 102) Suffice it to say, all of these affairs (and many others) turned out to be a pretty bad look for commonsense. Throughout the history of science, commonsense has a pretty awful track record.

What about philosophy? Here, ‘commonsense’ hardly fares better. For example, in 17^th Century England, Sir Robert Filmer enjoyed widespread fame for defending the ‘commonsensical’ idea that God endowed kings with a divine right to rule. However, this ‘commonsense’ did not stand the test of time. Instead, it was John Locke’s heretical idea that all people have natural rights—contrary to the classist and religious prejudices of the time—that served to influence future political and philosophical thought. Similarly, if we go back much further, to ancient Greece, we find that Aristotle took it to be simple commonsense that some people are fit to be slaves; Pythagoras thought it simple commonsensical that one should not eat beans, look in a mirror beside a lamp, or worship without shoes on. (Baird, p. 16) And so on. What we find here, again—throughout philosophical history, as in scientific history—is that what one generation takes to be commonsense the next takes to be foolish prejudices.

This is illustrated perhaps nowhere better than in the neo-Platonist Thomas Taylor’s satirical response to Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman entitled, “A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes”—where Taylor satirically argues, ‘if women have rights, why not animals too?”. Yes, in Taylor's satire, we get the following gem, where Taylor openly mocks the idea of moral equality:

IT APPEARS AT FIRST SIGHT SOMEWHAT SINGULAR, that a moral truth of the highest importance, and most illustrious evidence, should have been utterly unknown to the ancients, and not yet fully perceived, and universally acknowledged, even in such an enlightened age as the present. The truth I allude to is, the equality of all things, with respect to their intrinsic and real dignity and worth.... (p. 5)

And thus much may suffice, for an historical proof, that brutes are equal to men. It only now remains (and this must be the province of some able hand) to demonstrate the same great truth in a similar manner, of vegetable, minerals, and even the most apparently contemptible clod of earth; that thus this sublime theory being copiously and accurately discussed, and its truth established by an indisputable series of facts, government may be entirely subverted, subordination abolished, and all things everywhere, and in every respect, be common to all. (p. 28)

Of course, Taylor and his followers thought that extending rights to animals was so obviously antithetical to commonsense that it sufficed to demonstrate the absurdity of extending equal rights to women--not to mention the basic principle most of us now take to be obvious: that everyone is entitled to equal moral concern.

More broadly, if we look at philosophical history, it’s simply not ‘commonsense’ theories that have survived the test of time. In their time, Thomas Reid and William Whewell—commonsense moral intuitionists—were considered leading moral philosophers. However, moral philosophers today hardly study or engage with them. Why? Because, as John Stuart Mill put it, in his time 'commonsense' was used to defend the divine right of monarchs, the superior status of aristocracy, and the power of the church. (Reeves, p. 164) Mill found this repugnant, arguing that, “the regeneration required, of man and society…can never be effected under the influence of a philosophy which makes opinions their own proof, and feelings their own justification.” (Ibid.) For Mill, ‘commonsense’ is little more than “an apparatus for converting…prevailing opinions, on matters of morality, into reasons for themselves” (p. 241).

I am with Mill, Hume, Patricia Churchland, Dan Dennett, and other naturalistically-inclined philosophers. I don’t think philosophy should be in the business of ‘beginning with’ or ‘answering to’ commonsense at all. Commonsense is often (usually, I’d say) mistaken. Our task should be to place philosophy on better evidential foundations than that--specifically, on the findings of natural science, or at least on the kinds of principles of theory-selection that govern scientific practice. I know that not everyone shares my enthusiasm for ‘natural philosophy.’ Still, for all that, I am increasingly inclined to think it’s the best way to ensure that philosophical arguments and speculation are rooted in facts rather than in ill-founded, regressive prejudices of 'commonsense'—the former of which the world, it seems, now needs as much as (if not more than) ever.

In any case, whenever I hear philosophers say things like, "That's counterintuitive", "That's a serious bullet to bite", or "commonsense dictates", my inclination is not to find a way to make philosophy consistent with commonsense, but instead to figure out whether--given the actual facts that can be posited consistent with sound principles of theory-selection--commonsense has any truth to it at all!

Comments

[Chris]

If we distinguish:
1. Starting with common sense
vs.
2. Answering to common sense

one might claim that even in the scientific cases you mentioned, one starts with "common sense" (e.g., even Galileo starts with Aristotelian physics). It isn't clear where else one could "start".

Answering to common sense is a different issue, and of course there, you're right, the track record on science is to often reject common sense, based on careful observation, experimentation, and reasoning.

I'm sympathetic to a more scientific approach to philosophical issues, but with two caveats in mind:

(1)Sometimes, when philosophers say "that's counterintuitive" they're just trying to fit some new claim into their other claims, in good old fashion Quinean "web of belief" style.

(2) If you go the route of relying on theory selection in science as a model for philosophy, you'd better get confirmation theory right - my sense is that Quine, and others (Fodor, the Churchlands, D. Lewis, Flanagan, etc.) influenced by his confirmational holism, among other things, go wrong in just this way.

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Chris: That's a fair and insightful comment. I'm wondering if you could say a bit more about (2), just so I can get a better idea of how you think those folks go wrong...

[Daniel Greco]

I suspect you may be arguing against a straw man. I think you'd still disagree with Williamson's actual position, but I don't think the position you're attacking here is it. As you quote, he identifies common sense with "what most members of a society know." And knowing Williamson, I'm sure he's using know in what he takes to be its ordinary, factive sense. So it's just not true that common sense, given what he means by it, is often mistaken. Knowledge is factive, so it's never the case that most members of a society ever know something that's false.

Now you may argue that because we're often not good at distinguishing what most members of our society actually know (e.g., common sense in Williamson's sense) from what we merely take ourselves to know (all the examples you provide), Williamson isn't really describing a possible methodology. You can't "begin with what you know" if you don't know what you know.

Williamson will have responses here related to his luminosity argument--he'll accuse you of implicitly relying on the idea that something is only a possible methodology for inquiry if you can always know whether you're following it--but my point isn't to get into that debate, so much as to point out that it's not the same debate you're getting into in the OP.

On the question of whether philosophy should treat intuitive judgments as data, I think you'd be surprised to find Williamson is pretty much on your side--see what he says about the mistake of "psychologizing the evidence".

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Daniel: Thanks for chiming in. That's an insightful comment. Although I used the quote from Williamson's book as a jumping off point, my target isn't his particular view. Rather, it's the general practice--commonly invoked in philosophy books, journal articles, and conference discussions--that philosophy should begin with and answer to "commonsense", however that's plausibly understood.

As side note, I have a lot of issues with Williamson's epistemology and the 'knowledge-first' research program it has inspired. But at any rate, you hit the nail on the head on what I would want to say to Williamson, which is that human beings are *terrible* at knowing things and knowing what they know (or, more often, don't know)...and that basing philosophical arguments on what we think we know from the armchair is bad epistemological (and philosophical) practice.

As you note, Williamson might then talk about luminosity, or whatever--but, to me, this is a distraction from the real issue (or at least the issue that I want to focus on), which is simply whether appeals to "commonsense" (as philosophers tend to practice this) is a good methodology

This is the issue I'm concerned with--and my suggestion is that, Williamsonian epistemology aside, it's not a good practice, as it is *far* too open to 'psychologizing the evidence.' I'm glad, by the way, that Williamson is concerned with that! I am not convinced, however--from what I have read of his book or of his other work--that he or philosophy in general currently have an adequate approaching to preventing 'psychologizing the evidence.' This is a broader issue I've written some on in my recent work, and hope to work on some more, as I think philosophy stands to benefit a great deal from thinking through these issues more!

[Amanda]

You gave all the examples of when (supposedly) commonsense got things wrong, and it might seem like a lot. But it doesn't mean much unless you compare it to all the things commonsense has gotten right. It would be as though I started listing all the false things you ever said in your life, and then said, "See, look how many false things Marcus has said. You shouldn't trust anything that comes out of his mouth." When the total N is gigantic, a long list of non-conforming ns must be put in context of the total.

I would argue the list of what commonsense got right is much, much, longer than it got wrong. When I read Aristotle, I am always struck by how similarly he saw the world, even with all his false views on science and women and so on. Anyway, especially when you consider that the natural sciences are only one faction of what commonsense covers, I would argue that it has a very high batting average, overall. If you look at it from the perspective of all the wacky things philosophers have doubted, I suspect they are wrong 99% of the time. Whether we exist, whether we are the only people that exist, whether we are being deceived by a demon, etc.

Of course, it matters a lot how we define commonsense. I think there is a difference between commonsense, common knowledge, and cultural belief. Commonsense (how I see it, and how it is used at least sometimes) is what most people would believe, supposing they didn't have a lot of external or cultural influence. For instance, most people believe that other people exist. I think lots of the beliefs philosophers often state as commonsense, especially about science, have nothing to do with commonsense one way or the other. People naturally believe that our vision is more or less accurate, from close enough distances. Most people naturally believe it is wrong to have sex with pre-puberty children. Most people don't have any beliefs at all about, for instance, whether evolution is true.Beliefs about evolution come from education and culture.

There is also the issue about where we would start without commonsense. In order for philosophers to do philosophy with somebody besides themselves, they must agree to some common starting point. And that starting point is typically what both philosophers, or most philosophers involved, see as obviously true.

In spite of the above, I strongly support questioning commonsense. No belief should be beyond question because it confers with commonsense. But even when we do that, we have to still rely on other commonsense principles. When we try to answer the trolley problem, we cannot get distracted with whether or not gravity is real and hence whether trolleys really can roll down tracks.

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Amanda: That's fair. There are surely countless things that commonsense gets right, such as the fact that this is a computer, that there is a window behind it, a garden outside, and so on.

I guess my concern is a tendency in philosophy (and even science, as we see in Darwin's and Einstein's cases) to treat contentious theoretical ideas as "commonsense"--and as more or less axioms not to be denied on that basis alone--when, from my perspective, those very ideas arguably reflect a lot of implicit theorizing and enculturation.

For example, prior to relativity it was widely supposed by philosophers and scientists that space and time *had* to absolute - as it was thought to be basically 'self-evident' to commonsense (so much so that suggestions that it might not be were roundly dismissed and even mocked!). By a similar token, when I see philosophical theories and arguments dismissed as 'counterintuitive', or premises that seem controversial to me invoked as 'commonsense', I find it methodologically concerning.

Anyway, I guess that's the real thrust of my message. Not that commonsense is always mistaken - but that, given the historical track record of philosophy and science in overturning what *seemed* to be commonsense at the time, we should be much more skeptical of appeals to "commonsense" and what is "intuitive" or "counterintuitive" than is standard in philosophical practice.

[Chris]

Re: confirmational holism, I was thinking of Sober's papers "Mathematics and Indispensability" (from 1993), "Quine's Two Dogmas" (from 2000) and "Likelihood, Model-Selection and the Quine-Duhem problem" (from 2004) for what's wrong with confirmational holism. Sober's more recent book Ockham's razors is also relevant, though that is obviously more focused on simplicity (another criterion, besides confirmational holism, that philosophers often appeal to without thinking of how it is really justified in science).

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Chris: thanks for the references, that’s very helpful. I agree! I actually think some standard philosophical methods—specifically, appeals to commonsense, reflective equilibrium, etc.—run into those issues.

[Amanda]

Hi Marcus,
I pretty much agree with that. I guess I just like to frame it differently. Philosophers corrupt the definition of commonsense (something they do with so many other definitions!) and then claim they are friends of commonsense in order to engage in group think. That, for sure, should be avoided. And in the end I agree that nothing should be off the table for questioning, even if we cannot question everything at once.

[Matias Slavov]

I think you're right about the physics examples. I also very much sympathize with the "naturalistically-inclined philosophers." But shouldn't philosophy take everyday experience seriously? My favorite definition of our discipline comes from Wilhelm Jerusalem:

"Philosophy is the labor of thought undertaken in order to unite everyday experience and scientific research into a unitary and non-contradictory world-outlook."

Philosophy is not a science committed to empirical inquiry (at least primarily) but a "labor of thought." By creating concepts we try to come up with a worldview that is consistent with everyday experience and the results of the mature sciences. Things like past, present and future, flow of time, qualia, morality etc. are not there in the fundamental physical level but it doesn't mean they should be discarded.