In a groundbreaking article appearing in the Journal of Philosophical Progress, an area philosopher claims to have revolutionized philosophical methods, defending a new "conclusions-first philosophy" otherwise known as "conclusions fundamentalism." The philosopher explained, "All I have really done is take two influential methodological advances to their inevitable logical conclusion." When asked to elaborate, the philosopher explained, "For most of history, it was assumed that we need to explain the nature of philosophical phenomena. For instance, when we look at Plato's dialogues, we see Socrates and his interlocutors giving arguments for conclusions about the nature of things like knowledge, justice, and virtue."
"However, all of this changed near the turn of the 21st century", the philosopher continued. "In his 1999 book What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon argued that instead of trying to explain the nature of reasons for action, we should conclude that reasons are fundamental. This 'reasons-first' approach or 'reasons fundamentalism' has now become a dominant paradigm in action theory and moral philosophy. Interestingly, at around the same time, in his 2000 book Knowledge and Its Limits, Timothy Williamson argued that instead of trying to explain the nature of knowledge--for instance, in the traditional vein of giving necessary and sufficient conditions--we should instead believe that knowledge is primitive. Much like reasons-fundamentalism, this 'knowledge-first' approach has absolutely revolutionized the field."
According to some of the philosopher's closest colleagues, accepting these new 'X-first' paradigms did not come easily to the philosopher. "At first he kept insisting the new methods are nonsense, telling me that like half of the knowledge or reasons-claims asserted in published papers didn't seem to him like reasons or knowledge at all", an unnamed junior colleague noted. "However, he eventually came around", the colleague added, "I just had to remind him that objective truth is arrived at by beginning with whatever premises you and your interlocutors find plausible, and then by using logic to rigorously derive conclusions." Another senior colleague chimed in, "Personally, I just think he saw the obvious philosophical benefits of the new paradigms. It's so much easier to justify conclusions about knowledge and reasons when you can simply assert conclusions about them as premises."
When asked to describe the groundbreaking work to a lay audience, the conclusions-first theorist explained, "Dating all the way back to the ancients, philosophy has always been about giving arguments. Yet valid arguments are truth-preserving, which means that a valid argument's conclusion cannot be any less true than its set of premises. But, since philosophers disagree about premises at least as much as they disagree about conclusions--you know, "one person's modus ponens is another modus tollens"--we're really just as well off beginning with conclusions. After all, those who find a given conclusion plausible at the start don't really need an argument for it. On the other hand, those who don't find a given conclusion plausible would almost certainly reject premises used to argue for it--so you don't need arguments for them, either. Ergo, you don't need arguments for anyone, especially yourself, since you already know your conclusions. Indeed, G.E. Moore had it right almost a hundred years ago. He didn't need an argument to refute the external-world skeptic--he just needed to know the conclusion that skepticism is false, which of course he did. Here, let me show you: "Here's a hand...and here's another!".
When pressed to explain how we might tell the difference between when someone knows or has reasons to believe a given conclusion and when they don't, the philosopher huffed with a hint of frustration, "See, there you go, making the same mistake all over again again, demanding an argument. Look, we already know the conclusions that knowledge and reasons are primitive, right?" "Yes, Socrates" this reporter replied, "whatever you say, Socrates." The philosopher kept going, "Not only that: we also know that externalism is true about both reasons and knowledge--that neither can be reduced to psychology or anything internal to an agent. Thus, telling whether someone knows or has reasons to believe a given conclusion is easy. It's just a matter of our evidence! After all, as Williamson taught us, E=K, so the way to tell whether someone has primitive knowledge of or reasons to believe a given conclusion is even more straightforward than that: you just need to know what their evidence is--which is also primitive, since knowledge and evidence are one and the same." When a reporter asked the obvious question, "Wait, isn't that an argument you just gave?", the philosopher quipped, "Of course not, silly: it's just a series of conclusions--conclusions that you and I both know, but which you just weren't aware of until now because knowledge and reasons are external!"
When asked by this reporter what implications "conclusions-first philosophy" has for philosophical progress, the philosopher concluded, "The issue of progress--or lack therefore--is something that has always bothered philosophy's critics, including some philosophers. We've had all of these arguments for thousands of years, but so few firm conclusions. No more! Now that we know reasons and knowledge are primitive, progress is so much easier. Just today I realized that I know and have reasons to believe so many conclusions I once thought I had to argue for--conclusions that some of my interlocutors find plausible too! I've made so much progress so quickly, I can hardly imagine going back to the old way of doing things."
Happy April Fool's everybody! ;)
Previous years' gags:
the best April's fools ever. thank you
Posted by: anon | 04/01/2017 at 08:44 AM
Brilliant! I had forgotten it was April's fools so I got the full impact of this! ha
Posted by: Pendaran Roberts | 04/01/2017 at 04:29 PM
This was hilarious! Thanks.
Posted by: Justin Caouette | 04/02/2017 at 02:40 PM