The Philosophers' Cocoon

The problem of never-responded-to work in philosophy

Over the weekend, a number of my philosopher-friends shared the article, "Why Professors Are Writing Crap That Nobody Reads", on social media. The long and short of the article is that academic publishing has mostly turned into a scoring-system for tenure and promotion:

Professors usually spend about 3-6 months (sometimes longer) researching and writing a 25-page article to submit an article to an academic journal. And most experience a twinge of excitement when, months later, they open a letter informing them that their article has been accepted for publication, and will therefore be read by…

… an average of ten people.

 Yes, you read that correctly. The numbers reported by recent studies are pretty bleak:

- 82 percent of articles published in the humanities are not even cited once.

- Of those articles that are cited, only 20 percent have actually been read.

- Half of academic papers are never read by anyone other than their authors, peer reviewers, and journal editors.

So what’s the reason for this madness? Why does the world continue to be subjected to just under 2 million academic journal articles each year?

Well, the main reason is money and job-security. The goal of all professors is to get tenure, and right now, tenure continues to be awarded tenure based in part on how many peer-reviewed publications they have. Tenure committees treat these publications as evidence that the professor is able to conduct mature research.

A lot of my philosopher friends commented that this is disturbing--but I'm not sure it has been adequately appreciated just why it should disturb us. The real problem isn't that it has turned academic publishing into a cynical and depressing mechanism for personal advancement. The problem is that it undermines the epistemic credentials of our discipline. Allow me to explain.

Real jobs in philosophy part 11: Jerry Green (University of Oklahoma)

By JG

So, I haven’t written in a while, because I’ve been busy in my first few weeks of learning to be a professor rather than a grad student. But I realized that this is an opportunity for a post, in our Real Jobs in Philosophy series. The entries so far have been mainly tenured or tenure-track (though see Leigh M. Johnson's post). Given the proliferation in very short-term jobs, I thought it would be worth it to add my perspective from a non-renewable one-year position.

But before getting started: If you’re interested in sharing what your job is like, let us know! 

Score one for Rightness as Fairness? Results of a new study on mental time-travel

In my new book, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, I argue that moral cognition and motivation--and by extension morality itself--emerges out of a problem of diachronic instrumental rationality (or rationality across time) that I call "the problem of possible future selves." In brief outline, the problem is that throughout our lives, we are capable of recognizing that we not only have interests in the present, but will have interests in the future--though, since the future has not yet come, we do not know for certain what those interests are. Thus, we have to somehow justify our actions to our future selves, despite not knowing precisely who our future self will actually be. I argue that morality itself--understood in terms of four principles of fairness--is the only rational solution to this problem, and that the moral theory that emerges from these foundations (Rightness as Fairness) satisfies seven principles of theory selection better than alternatives.

In the book, I argue that a number of converging lines of evidence favor the proposition that morality is founded in the problem of possible future selves, and thus, that (contrary to much of moral philosophy) morality and prudence are continuous rather than discontinuous (or distinct). [Note: references to the findings summarized below are in Rightness as Fairness].

First, it turns out that one of the general cognitive capacities that underlies the problem of possible future selves--the capacity of mental-time travel (which consists in the ability to imaginatively occupy one's own different possible pasts and futures)--varies in human and animal species in more or less direct proportion to moral responsibility. Normal human adults have robust mental time-travel capacities. In contrast, children and adolescents--who we say colloquially are "unable to appreciate the consequences of their actions"--have reduced and still developing capacities to imagine and care about their future. Further, human psychopaths--who are notoriously unable to "perceive moral reasons"--appear to lack robust mental time-travel capacities (and lack brain development in areas thought to be responsible for these capacities. Finally, nonhuman animals also appear to lack mental time-travel capacities. In the book, I also argue that our capacities of mental time-travel underlie our capacity of perspective-taking (i.e. seeing others' perspectives and interests as possibly our own).

Second, it turns out in various studies that mental time travel capacities coupled with caring about one's future are strongly implicated in both moral and prudential behavior. On the one hand, some of the strongest individual-level predictors of criminally delinquent behavior are (a) impulsivity, and (b) lack of concern for one's future. On the other hand, studies where people are actively primed to think about their future--such as by interacting with an aged virtual reality version of themselves--have found improved moral and prudential behavior (viz. a tendency to save more money and lesser willingness to cheat or endorse selling stolen property). 

It turns out a new study further supports this picture of moral and prudential deliberation! The study, in Scientific Advances, found via transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) that a single brain-region--the temporoparietal junction (TPJ)--underlies our capacity to imagine our future selves and place ourselves "in each other's shoes." Further, TMS was used to inhibit activity in that brain region...and the results were these:

Subjects with an inhibited TPJ were less likely to share the money and were more likely to take the money up front rather than delay gratification and wait for a larger prize. They were also less able take on the perspective of the avatar, which makes sense, says Christian Ruff, a co-author of the paper and an economist at the University of Zurich. “The function of perspective-taking is essential to both of these tasks,” he says, in terms of both “thinking how someone else would feel if you give them money and also how you yourself in the future would feel with that money.”

The findings suggest that the TPJ plays an important role in perspective-taking, which Ruff describes as “a very basic social mechanism” that is essential not only for helping us figure out what other people may be thinking and feeling during social interactions but also in self-control, as we weigh the needs and desires of our current self against the needs and desires of our imagined future self.

Beyond addiction, self-control and our ability to delay gratification is relevant to almost every decision we make in life, from finishing school to exercising regularly to saving for retirement, which is why Ruff considers understanding self-control central to improving health and well-being.

Joseph Kable, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania who was not involved in the study, finds the results interesting and surprising. “Most of the research on this brain area which they are inhibiting has suggested that it plays a role in social decisions, in perspective-taking,” Kable says. “I don't think many people would have predicted that it would have a role in temporal dilemmas, where you face this conflict between a smaller immediate reward and a larger reward that you can only get if you wait until the future.”

The researchers might not have predicted that the same brain regions would underlie perspective-taking (viz. moral deliberation) and temporal dilemmas (viz. prudence)...but Rightness as Fairness did. :)

Grad school admissions & applicants' interests

There was a brief discussion at Leiter reports earlier this week about writing samples for grad school admission, and one issue that came up was whether an applicant's writing sample should match their philosophical interests. An anonymous applicant wrote in:

I'm a prospective philosophy PhD applicant preparing my applications, and I just have two questions about the writing sample that I hope you and/or readers of your blog could illuminate on. 

1) There seems to be conflicting suggestions as to whether the writing sample(s) should match the applicant's interests. I wonder which suggestion is right.

On the one hand, Richard Heck writes on Brown University philosophy department's website: "the writing sample does not have to be connected, in any way, with the area or areas you think you most want to pursue in graduate school."  (https://www.brown.edu/academics/philosophy/application-advice)

On the other hand, Paul Weirich commented in a post on your blog: "The writing sample, besides demonstrating qualifications, shows whether the student's interests fit the department well."  (http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2010/10/ma-students-and-phd-applications.html)

In the comments section, Tim O'Keefe shared the following reflections:

It's far better to have a writing sample that demonstrates an applicant's ability to do good work related to one of their self-declared areas of interest rather than something out of area. Having something out of area isn't automatically disqualifying--after all, it can show that you're capable of doing good philosophical work in general, and people often switch their AOIs after entering a program. But programs are usually looking to balance their grad student body based on their interests and fit with the program, and if you're pitching yourself to us as a 'philosophy of mind' person, it will raise eyebrows if you've got a paper on Anselm's Ontological Argument.

David Chalmers then added:

the admissions process works differently at different places, but one common route to admission is to have strong support from a faculty member in your area who is enthusiastic about working with you...that said, it's common for admissions committee (including NYU) to put much more weight on strength of writing sample than on area of interest (partly because areas can change), and it's quite common to be admitted in virtue of a strong writing sample regardless of area. so all in all, i'd agree with tim that other things being equal it's certainly better to have a writing sample close to the area of declared interest, but if your best work by far is in an different area, you may do better to use that work.

While I think it is natural for admissions committees to take into account applicants' interests--and I also understand why they might do so (viz. O'Keefe's point about "fit" with the program and Chalmers' points about enthusiasm for what a candidate is working on), I want to raise two concerns about applicants' interests playing a significant role in admissions that, as far as I can tell, are rarely discussed.

Call for Papers: Linguistic Justice and Analytic Philosophy

Call for Papers: Linguistic Justice and Analytic Philosophy

Special issue of Philosophical Papers

Guest editors: Filippo Contesi (Jean Nicod Institute), Moti Mizrahi (Florida Tech), Enrico Terrone (FMSH)

The topics of linguistic discrimination and linguistic justice have received little attention from contemporary analytic philosophers despite the fact that there is a growing body of evidence in linguistics and social psychology about implicit negative biases towards speakers and writers perceived as non-native. In fact, issues of linguistic discrimination and justice are particularly urgent in analytic philosophy because English is undoubtedly the lingua franca of contemporary analytic philosophy. For this reason, it is important to think about what it means to be a person for whom English is not a first language and who tries to participate in the academic life of contemporary analytic philosophy.

The aim of this special issue of Philosophical Papers is to consider the circumstances of being a non-native speaker and writer of English in analytic philosophy. In addition to philosophical and meta-philosophical perspectives, we also encourage submissions from different approaches and disciplines, including psychology, linguistics and the social sciences.

Possible questions for discussion include:

• Is there linguistic discrimination or injustice in analytic philosophy? If so, what should we do about it?
• Are the percentages of non-native-speaker faculty members of the most reputable analytic philosophy departments comparable to those in arts and humanities or STEM departments? What should any differences teach us?
• How can diversity of native languages and cultures be beneficial, if at all, to analytic philosophy?
• Are perceived linguistic fluency and eloquence important factors in philosophical writing and presenting? Should they be?
• Is it true, as is sometimes claimed, that publishing philosophical work in the most reputable venues in contemporary analytic philosophy only requires linguistic competence of a level that is reasonably easy for a non-native writer to achieve?
• Should English (or any other language) be the lingua franca of contemporary analytic philosophy?
• Should study and research in analytic philosophy be a global and cosmopolitan enterprise?
• What, if any, extra policies can or should professional journals or institutions adopt to address any specific difficulties faced by non-native speakers and writers?
• Are there any precedents in the history of intellectual communities, including contemporary ones and those in different philosophical traditions, that can provide a useful model for how to approach the language issue in analytic philosophy?
• How does the language issue intersect with issues of race, ethnicity or nationality (or other issues) in analytic philosophy? How important are such intersections (or lack thereof)?

The deadline for receipt of submissions is October 1, 2017. This issue of Philosophical Papers, comprising both invited and submitted articles, will appear in March 2018. Invited contributors include Elisabetta Galeotti, Eric Schliesser, and Eric Schwitzgebel.

Authors should submit manuscripts electronically, as a PDF or MS Word document attachment, to the Managing Editor at philosophical.papers@ru.ac.za. Authors should include their full name, affiliation, and address for email correspondence with their submission.

Further inquiries may be addressed to the Editor of Philosophical Papers, Ward Jones (e.jones@ru.ac.za) or Filippo Contesi (filippo.contesi@york.ac.uk).

What counts as philosophy? On the normative disguised as descriptive UPDATED

As a scholar of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā I am well aware of how the normative is often disguised as descriptive. "It is seven o' clock" says the mother, but what she means is rather "Get up! You have to go to school".

 

Similarly, complex discourses about the nature of philosophy, how it was born, e.g., in Greece or in Plato's Republic, and how it developed in (Latin), German, (French) and English, are only meant to say "We are not going to welcome colleagues working on things we do not care for in our departments". Why so? Because as soon as one tries to reason with the authors of the allegedly descriptive statements (as done here by Ethan Mills and here by Amod Lele), one gets answers such as "the universality of philosophy", "the primacy of logical argumentation", "the importance of debate", "the supremacy of reason over tradition" etc. All of them can be easily found at least in some Indian schools.

I am not saying that they are not found in African, Chinese, Mesoamerican philosophy, I am just saying that no matter how restrictive your definition of philosophy, Navya Nyāya, etc., will fit in. Conversely, Thomas the Aquinas, Augustine, Nietzsche etc. will end up being excluded by such definitions. Thus, the argument is in fact overtly not descriptive.

Does it mean that we should try to make philosophers accept at least Navya Nyāya etc? Or should we rather uncover the normativity of the discourse and call for a broader definition of the enterprise of philosophy?

An insightful discussion of the same issue, with extensive quotes and critical reflections about them can be read in Malcolm Keating's blog, here.

Eric Schwitzgebel offers further interesting reflections on the issue in his blog (be sure to check the comments and his accurate replies to the "ignorance justifying ignorance" argument, as well as the labels for the "not really philosophy" and "low quality" arguments).

UPDATE: "Prof Manners" has an interesting post here explaining that articles trying to say that Confucius is not "philosophical" because philosophy is x, y, z in fact only list "generally desirable and admiration-worthy qualities".

 

(cross-posted on my personal blog, where you can read also some interesting comments regarding the inclusion (or lack thereof) of Islamic philosophy, and on the Indian Philosophy blog, where you can read some comments regarding the organisation of philosophy institutes.)

 

Reader query: a job-market quandary

In response to our latest, "How can we help you?" post, an anonymous reader writes in:

I am currently on the job market and would love advice on how to signal in my applications that I will certainly be done in time to start a position in the summer or fall. I have heard conflicting advice on this: defend as early as possible, have the PhD in hand, etc. I am in a situation where I could defend as early as March (and my whole committee has met and agreed that I am ready), but as soon as I defend, my funding gets cut off. So I would like to hold off on the defence so that I can continue to receive funding and not go into debt (!!) If I say in my cover letter that I will be defending in June, is that a red flag or is it early enough for search committees to take my application seriously?

This is an excellent question, as in my experience many (most?) grad students face this quandary. On the one hand, if they defend their dissertation before going on the job-market, they cannot continue to get grad school funding (which, obviously, can be a big problem if they don't get a job). On the other hand, if they don't defend before going on the market, that might undermine their job-market competitiveness, as search committees want to be sure a candidate will have their PhD. What should grad students in this position do?

Unfortunately, it is not at all clear. In response to the above query, another commenter, "Jaded", wrote in:

A search committee has no reason to believe an applicant that s/he will be done her/his dissertation when s/he says s/he will be done in an application letter. We have all been lied to far too many times. And the applicant is not always in the best position to say this with any authority. Indeed, most of us do not even trust thesis supervisors on this issue. I know this is not what you want to hear but that is how it looks from the other side of the table. I would always pick an applicant who has their degree in hand.

In my experience, Jaded has good reason to be jaded. I've heard of more than a few cases of candidates (and their letter-writers) saying the candidate would defend before getting hired, only for the candidate to not defend before being hired. In these cases, the candidates (who, I expect, thought they were acting in good faith) put the school they were hired by in a bad situation. The candidates could not only not be hired into the job they applied for (instead of being hired as Assistant Professors, they had to be hired as Lecturers or Instructors); they also had to continue working on their dissertation while on the job--something which, in many different ways, is a very bad way to start things off (it not only puts the hiring institution in a bad spot; it puts the person hired in a terrible spot, as it may not only frustrate their new colleagues also but prevent them from effectively transitioning into their new job-responsibilities, i.e. teaching and publishing for tenure).

Unfortunately, although Jaded's remarks are apt--and job-candidates should be aware that search committees may be likely to think just as Jaded does--the question still remains: what should candidates do? I wonder what the community thinks. For my part, I have two ideas.

First, I wonder whether there might be creative ways that candidates might demonstrate to committees that they will indeed defend before being hired. While I know some candidates go on the market with only a few chapters of their dissertation finished (and these, presumably, are the potentially overly-optimistic folks that search-committee members like Jaded worry about), I've known other candidates to go on the market with most of their dissertation already drafted. Here's one creative possibility for the latter candidates. What if they posted a dissertation table of contents and drafts of their completed chapters to a private webpage, noting in their letter that their dissertation is mostly drafted and linking to the private webpage in their letter or CV? I'm not sure if that would entirely assuage search-committee members' concerns--but I imagine it might comfort them a whole lot more than simply the candidate or their letter-writers merely saying they will be finished! 

Second, I cannot help but wonder whether grad programs need to better address this entire situation. In recent years, I have heard of some grad programs more or less assuring their new PhDs of temporary employment at their home department for at least one year after receiving their degree. This seems to me a kind and responsible thing to do in today's brutal academic market. Given that grad students spend anywhere from 5-10 years in their grad program, setting aside temporary Instructor positions for newly minted PhDs seems to me far preferable to just cutting students loose onto the market without further funding.

Anyway, what do you all think? Do you have any suggestions or better solutions?

What should grad programs and candidates do to improve competitiveness for teaching jobs?

Most of our discussions at the Cocoon on improving one's job-market competitiveness have focused on publishing. There are probably good reasons for this, as an ability to publish effectively is important for tenure and promotion at most tenure-track jobs. However, at the Cocoon conference this past weekend, I and another tenure-track faculty member from another institution were asked a really good question by several grad students: what should PhD programs and candidates do to improve candidates' competitiveness for jobs at teaching-focused institutions? I'm actually a bit disappointed we're never discussed this question before, as it became quite clear during our conversation (viz. agreement between the other faculty member and I) that grad programs could probably do a much better job in this regard. Allow me to explain.

What publishing advice are grad students receiving? Is it sound advice?

We have discussed publishing strategies on the Cocoon many times before--and I have on multiple occasions questioned the conventional advice that one should only publish in "top" journals. As I will once again explain below, my own personal experience does not sit well with this conventional advice--nor, I think, does it sit well with some general reflections on the nature of the academic job market. Given that we have discussed these issues so many times, why do I want to broach them again? The answer is simple: I have repeatedly (and recently) encountered graduate students who, or so they tell me, are still receiving the same advice I received while in graduate school--the advice to only publish in "top" journals, not in lower-tier ones (indeed, I was actually told to avoid publishing in lower-ranked journals, as it might "reflect badly" on me as a job-candidate). Why are grad students receiving this advice? And is it good advice? Let's work through some of this again.

2016 Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference - Day 2

The second and final day of the 4th Annual Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference wrapped up yesterday afternoon, and I happy to report that it was a wonderful weekend! I'd just like to thank everyone--particularly all of the conference participants who flied or Skyped in--for making it such a supportive, constructive event. Here are a few pictures from the final day:

Pictured speakers: Tim Loughrist (University of North Alabama) & Benjamin Yelle (Mount Holyoke) by Skype

Pictured speaker: Kevin Richardson (MIT)

Pictured speaker: Jill Cumby (York University)

Pictured speaker: Thomas Metcalf (Spring Hill College)

Pictured speaker: Gregory Stoutenberg (University of Idaho)

Pictured speaker: Samuel Kampa (Fordham)

Pictured speaker: Camille Pascale (University of Toronto) by Skype

Pictured speaker: Alexis Elder (University of Minnesota Duluth) by Skype

Pictured speaker: Haoying Liu (UMass Amherst)

2016 Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference - Day 1

The first day of the 4th Annual Philosophers' Cocoon Philosophy Conference wrapped up yesterday evening. I'd like to thank all of the participants for making it a great first day full of wonderful talks and supportive, constructive dialogue! Here are a few pictures of the festivities:

Pictured speakers: Sander Verhaegh (Tilburg University) by Skype & Wes Siscoe (University of Arizona)

Pictured speakers: Allauren Forbes (University of Pennsylvania) & Alexis Elder (University of Minnesota Duluth) by Skype

Pictured speaker: Paul So (Texas Tech)

Pictured speaker: Jason Chen (St. Louis University)

 

Pictured speaker: Jared Riggs (University of Toronto)

Pictured speaker: Robert M. Farley (Hillsborough Community College)

Pictured speaker: Meagan Phillips (Northern Illinois University)

Pictured speakers: Derek Shiller (Independent Scholar) & Adam Thompson (University of Nebraska Lincoln) by Skype

Pictured speaker: Daniel Tippens (NYU)

Pictured speaker: Mary Beth Willard (Weber State University)

Pictured speakers: Landon Elkind (University of Iowa) & Joanna Luc (Jagiellonian University) by Skype

Pictured speaker: Laura Matthews (University of Georgia)

Pictured: Good times together! :)

Should we expand the Cocoon's scope and mission?

Dear friends,

For the past four-and-a-half years, the Cocoon's mission has been to provide safe and supportive forum for early-career philosophers. It has always been very important to me to be a blog by and for early-career people, given that early-career philosophers--grad students, job-marketeers, adjuncts, postdocs, VAPs etc.--are among the most vulnerable members of the profession. As an early-career person myself--as someone who struggled getting through grad school, then surviving on the job-market for a number of years, etc.--for a long time I felt lost and alone in the discipline, and so my hope was to create a place where early-career people like myself could feel not so alone and instead help each other through our trials and tribulations.

I have been asked a few times over the years whether the Cocoon would always focus solely on early-career issues, or whether the blog's scope might eventually broaden. Because I generally believe in publicly negotiating fair solutions to issues that affect others rather than making unilateral decisions, my answer has always been that while my own preference would be to always keep the blog solely devoted to early-career issues, the fair thing to do is for the community to decide if and when the blog's focus should ever change.

Philosophical discussions: a metaphilosophical proposal

In my previous entry in this series, "Metaphilosophical concerns", I traced out some similarities between philosophy as it is practiced today and pre-scientific psychology. Several decades ago, before psychology increasingly adopted scientific methodology,

1. Theories in psychology were based primarily on how things "seemed" to different investigators.
2. Without any clear protections against forms of cognitive or emotional bias, motivated reasoning, etc.

This resulted in opposing theoretical camps--Freudianism, Jungianism, Behaviorism, Humanism, Instinct Theory--whose practitioners tended to think that their favored framework was better supported by arguments than their rivals. Unfortunately, this tended to result in very problematic forms of argument, such as post-hoc reasoning where each framework would marshall their own theoretical resources to "explain" the same phenomena. If, for instance, a patient resisted treatment, Freudians would say, "Of course - that's just what our theory of reaction formation predicts!"; Humanists would say, "Of course - that's precisely what one would expect from a humanistic drive to self-actualize!; and so on. The end result was a bunch of theoretical stalemates, in which proponents of each perspective maintained their framework was the most coherent with the evidence. The premises that one group of people found "plausible" did not seem all that plausible to people on the other side of the debate.

How can we help you?

A few weeks ago, I decided to start a new feature at the Cocoon, "How can we help you?". Basically, because the Cocoon is here to help early-career philosophers (e.g. grad students, job-marketeers, postdocs, adjuncts, etc.), I thought it might be a good idea to solicit questions from readers on a fairly regular basis. Given that we are rapidly approaching the heart of the fall academic job market, I figured now might be a good time to once again solicit reader queries. So, then, how can we help you? Do you have questions about the job market you could use help with? Or, are you grappling with non-job-market things that we might help with? Just chime in below in the comment section and we'll do our best to lend a helping hand! 

APA Grad Student Council: nominations open!

Many of you probably received an email notification about this today, but if you didn't or otherwise missed it (mine went into my spam folder!), the APA has approved the creation of a new Grad Student Council. Here is the short description of the council's aims:

The GSC will serve as a liaison between the graduate students in the discipline of philosophy and the APA, reporting to the board of officers on issues of interest, concern, and relevance to philosophy graduate students. The GSC will advise the board on how to best serve and support graduate students and may take up projects of its own as well.

The GSC will be made up of 12 philosophy graduate students. In an effort to balance both the need for diversity (professional, demographic, geographic, institutional) of the GSC membership, and the desire for democratic selection, the GSC will include both elected and appointed members. Eight of the members will be appointed by a selection committee including members of the GSC and members of the board of officers. Four members will be elected by the student associate members of the APA.

Given that grad students are among the most vulnerable members the profession, and the kinds of concerns that grad students often voice (many of which, as a former grad student, I identify with!), I for one applaud the APA's decision to create such a council, and hope it affords grad students a greater voice in the profession, as well as a representative one. On that note, let me just express my strong personal hope that--as a matter of fairness/fair representation--the APA will put together a council comprised by grad students from a representative array of programs, not primarily "highly ranked" programs but also "lower ranked" and "unranked programs" as well.

In any case, here are the links where one can nominate oneself and nominate others. If you care about grad student issues and interests, please do nominate someone you think would be a good advocate!

Recent work by Cocooners

The following works were either published or uploaded to philpapers by Cocoon contributors during the month of September:

Helen De Cruz (2016). Numerical Cognition and Mathematical Realism. Philosophers' Imprint 16 (16).

Helen De Cruz & Ryan Nichols (eds.) (2016). Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy. Bloomsbury.

Trevor Hedberg & Jordan Huzarevich (forthcoming). Appraising Objections to Practical Apatheism. Philosophia:1-20.

Is there anyone I missed? Just let me know and I'll update the list!

A helpful job-market guide

Carolyn Dicey Jennings (UC Merced) has posted a brief, helpful guide to the academic job-market here. Interested readers are also encouraged to check our own own Job-Market Boot Camp!