Grappling with "the most important issues in the profession"

I came across this poll today run by Brian Leiter earlier this year on "the most important issues in the profession." Although there were only 725 responses to the poll, and respondents self-selected, the top 5 issues voted for were:

1. Bad job market, decline of tenure-track faculty positions, increasing reliance on adjuncts  (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices)

2. Declining state support for higher education  loses to Bad job market, decline of tenure-track faculty positions, increasing reliance on adjuncts by 460–158

3. Hyper-specialization and/or increasing irrelevance of philosophy to public/culture at large  loses to Bad job market, decline of tenure-track faculty positions, increasing reliance on adjuncts by 552–104, loses to Declining state support for higher education by 451–176

4. Erosion of tenure  loses to Bad job market, decline of tenure-track faculty positions, increasing reliance on adjuncts by 597–35, loses to Hyper-specialization and/or increasing irrelevance of philosophy to public/culture at large by 301–294

5. Prestige bias in hiring and/or publication decisions  loses to Bad job market, decline of tenure-track faculty positions, increasing reliance on adjuncts by 569–66, loses to Erosion of tenure by 307–264

Interestingly, there was comparatively little written about what we can and should do to better address these issues in the comments section that followed Leiter's post, as the discussion turned very quickly to issues concerning gender equity (issues which appeared lower down in the poll, among the "top-10" issues facing the profession).

Because the top-5 voted-for issues receive very little discussion, I thought it might be worthwhile to discuss them now, at the end of the 2015 (as I always find it natural, at the end of the year, to both reflect on the past and future!). What can, and should, we do about the bad job-market, declining state funding for education, hyper-professionalization, etc.?

I realize that these are all very difficult issues to address, and I (like many, I think) feel relatively helpless to do much about most of them. However, allow me to offer up a few brief thoughts on each, and then open things up for discussion:

1. A few thoughts on improving the bad job-market: As we all know, there are fewer tenure-track jobs in the academy a whole, and increasing reliance on adjunct labor. The socio-economic forces behind this trend are very difficult to address, and many people are attempting to address them through information dissemination (sharing facts and stories), as well as through activism. I've suggested before that this is all the fairly inevitable result of political decisions made decades ago, and as far as I can tell the best we can do, here and now, is simply support information dissemination and activism for more full-time tenure track jobs (which I think is in students' interests, our interests, and yes, universities' long-term interests, as parents and politicians increasingly demand actual return on investment--i.e. a sound education, which empirical research indicates is indeed best advanced by full-time, tenure-track faculty). In the short-term, however, there is the other question of what we can best do to improve the job market in philosophy. For although tenure-track jobs are in decline overall, some fields have seen dramatic increases in tenure-track faculty in recent years. For example, the academic job-market in my wife's field (Industrial-Organizational Psychology) is fantastic. Similarly, there have been notable increases in jobs in economics. Finally, it's not just STEM fields: my university hires several tenure-track faculty in English just about every year. What's the key? Answer: there number of tenure-track jobs in any given department generally seems to be a function of three things: (A) how much outside funding the department receives (e.g. grants, etc.), (B) how many majors the department has, and (C) how entrenched in university "core" requirements (i.e. how many "service" courses) the department offers. For instance, at my university (University of Tampa), English is one the largest departments we have. Why? Simple: every student has to take two First Year Writing courses. Similarly, my wife's department is booming because they get outside grants. Finally, the more majors a department has, the easier it is to (economically) justify hiring more full-time people. All of which suggests to me that if we want the philosophy job-market to thrive again, we must increasingly do three things: secure outside funding (which already seems to be in ascendance, with more and more philosophers getting things like Templeton grants), better grow our major, and better insinuate ourselves as core "service" courses in our universities. How can we do the latter two things--attract more majors and become service courses? In my experience, it seems clear to me: focus more on growing, and emphasizing, "applied" areas of philosophy--business ethics (for business majors), biomedical ethics (for nursing and pre-med students), philosophy of law (for pre-law students), political theory (for poly-sci students), feminist philosophy (for gender-studies students), etc. Indeed, in my view, the fact that applied philosophy still seems (as far as I can tell) to be somewhat looked down upon at the highest levels of our discipline--as not as "important" as core areas of inquiry, such as metaphysics or epistemology--has been something of a grave tactical error on our discipline's part over the past 5+ decades. Whatever one thinks about the relative levels of importance of different areas of philosophy, the simple fact is that the discipline as a whole will tend to be funded (in the modern socioeconomic environment) to the extent that it is seen--by educators, parents, students, and politicians--as useful. Accordingly, if we want more jobs in "core" areas, the way to go about it is to first grow departments by focusing on applied areas (as, the more popular a department is, the better able it will be able to justify more hires in all areas). 
2. A few thoughts on improving state funding for higher-education: This is probably the most difficult issue of all here, but, although it pains me to say it, I suspect it may best dealt with in terms of "outcomes assessment." Although faculty at universities today (in my experience) chafe at having to measure student outcomes, it seems plausible to me that in the current economic environment, the only way for higher-education (and the humanities in particular) to survive is to demonstrate, in some quantifiable way(s), that we are educating students successfully for the modern world. I say this, by the way, as someone who would wholeheartedly agree with the general claim that "the point" of a liberal-arts/humanities education should ultimately be to produce thoughtful, intelligent people, not merely people who can compete successfully in the modern economy. That being said, I think it is always important to not throw the baby out with the bathwater, pursuing ideals to their own detriment. Practicalities are always important. If we want more people to be educated in the liberal-arts/humanities--to become more thoughtful, well-rounded people--the way to do it is to first grow these areas of higher-education so that they become more well-funded. The more we can show ordinary citizens that humanities/liberal arts educations are both practical and meaningful for their own sake, the more likely we are to realize the highest, most laudable ideals we have.
3. A few thoughts on hyper-specialization: I am all for specialized work. All academic disciplines have it. Yet, as many have noted, the current job-market seems to have led academic philosophers to publish more quickly and more often, leading (it seems) to more and more papers of the form, "A response to X's reply to Y's argument"--that is, work on really narrow topics/arguments of primary interest to specialists. If modern physics should teach us anything, it is that public relations is key. In my view, there is a ton of really bad pop-physics (including some pop-physics books by people who are otherwise excellent physicists). In one sense, at the level of intellectual ideals, this really bugs me. But, at another level, the level of practicalities in service of good intellectual ideals, the popularization of physics has been incredibly positive. The more bestselling books, television programs, and magazines there are in physics, the more public and private funding there is likely to be for the field--even when it comes to the funding the pursuit of very abstract discoveries with no clear relevance to daily life. This leads me to a few thoughts, relating back to first two topics: the job-market and funding of higher education. If we want to improve the health of our discipline, we need to better incentivize (A) publishing "big ideas" (which, or so I have argued, plausibly requires editors and journal referees to substantially rethink and revise publication standards), and (B) the publication of popular philosophy on said "big ideas."
4. Some thoughts on the erosion of tenure: See everything I've written above. :)
5. A few thoughts on prestige bias in hiring and publication decisions: I think it's very hard to distinguish "prestige bias" from  reward due to merit (as it is possible that departmental prestige and merit are positively related). I also think it's incredibly difficult to prevent potential or actual prestige bias, as there are all kinds of plausible contributors to it (e.g. presenting papers at conferences, colloquia, etc., and circulating paper drafts among specialists prior to "anonymized" submission for peer review). The best ways to track, and prevent, prestige bias seem to me to involve improving journal editorial practices. In particular, I would suggest that it might be a "best practice" (supported by the APA) for journal editors to ensure that papers placed under review are always reviewed by at least one reviewer not at a "top" program, so as to correct to some extent for any in-group favoritism that might result from sending out papers to "top people" who already know the author, effectively undermining peer-review. Although some might respond that papers at top journals should be evaluated "by top specialists" in the field, this seems rather insulting to me: although we may not all be the next Derek Parfit, Martha Nussbaum, or whomever, we are all philosophy PhDs capable, I think, of distinguishing a good argument from a bad one--and the importance of protecting against bias/undermining of anonymized review is critical for the intellectual integrity of the discipline.

Anyway, these are just some of my thoughts. I am by no means wedded to the correctness of any of them, and would be happy to rethink, revise, or abandon any, or even all, of them. What are your thoughts?

Comments

[John Protevi]

Thank you for these reflections, Marcus.

I highly recommend this essay by Chris Newfield on points 1 and 2 above: https://profession.commons.mla.org/2015/12/16/the-humanities-as-service-departments-facing-the-budget-logic/

The blog to which Newfield contributes: http://utotherescue.blogspot.com/

Newfield's home page, with links to his excellent books: https://www.english.ucsb.edu/people/newfield-christopher (_Ivy and Industry_ and _Unmaking the Public University_ are essential reading IMO).

My two cents: http://www.newappsblog.com/2012/12/changing-our-frame-of-reference-from-job-market-to-political-economy-of-philosophy-instruction.html

[Bob]

I am not sure if improving journal editorial practices will help that much with the prestige bias. (Although, it is a good thing in itself!) I know candidates from lower ranked schools who have multiple publications in top 5 journals. They have been on the job market for multiple years with no TT job offers. And we all know that individuals from top schools often get hired with no publications.

What we need is for hiring committees to give candidates from lower ranked (or even middle ranked) schools a chance. This would be especially helpful if higher ranked schools did so. But alas, reputation is probably too important to most schools to even give this a try. I do not doubt that, on average, those from top schools are better philosophical researchers. My problem is that it is Nearly Impossible for even the best individuals from even mid-ranked schools to have a chance at top research schools.

[Ed]

On 5.

It used to be that at the smoker famous supervisors and professors of job seekers would make the rounds and chat up their students. I got the sense that more famous and more senior people at more prestigious departments did more of this than less famous, less senior people from less prestigious departments.

I've been on one search committee and we did get a little bit of this sort of thing via email and if anecdotes from trusted friends are to be believed, there are some people (and indeed some departments) who really hype their students via email and phone calls now that the smoker is less of an event.

So a couple questions (which are possibly concerns too):

1. IF this sort of student promoting goes on, do more prestigious departments take part more than less prestigious ones?

2. IF this sort of thing goes on, should it be of concern? I think it should be if 1 is a 'yes'.

If it doesn't go on (or if no one pays attention to it if it does), never mind me. My sense is that it does go on and that it matters. I think it would make more sense if everyone to agreed to write the letters they want read and let the committees work with those rather than doing this extra thing that not all supervisors are comfortable or willing to do.

[Jim]

All good thoughts. Another way philosophy departments can and do and should "insinuate" themselves into the core curriculum of the university is through critical thinking courses.

[postdoc]

I looked through NYU's placement and noticed that many of their students are getting placed with little or no publications.

I guess we need to rethink what it means to be a good philosopher. What's relevant to getting into a program like NYU? Great grades, great writing sample, great undergrad institution. In my experience, none of these things are sufficient for being a great philosopher or even necessary.

Imagine someone who goes to a middle of the row university, ends up doing a terminal MA to get his/her grades up, and goes to a decent PhD program towards the bottom of the Leiter rankings, but then hits his/her stride and makes numerous original, quality contributions to philosophy.

Isn't this person a better philosopher than an NYU student who hasn't ever published anything?

Let's put this another way: Shouldn't the student who contributed to philosophy by publishing high quality original research be rewarded with a job before an NYU student who has contributed nothing?

I wish I had been aware of how messed up philosophy is as a profession.

[Derek Bowman]

Two thoughts on (1), one though on (2), and one thought on (5).

1a: You don't say anything about reducing the number of people competing for academic jobs. This will require not only by broadening our horizons about other career paths for PhDs, but also reducing the number of PhDs produced, possibly by redirecting funds for PhD stipends/waivers to fully funded MA spots. Without this, the job market will continue to be terrible, even with whatever feasible steps we take to improve institutional support for filling/creating faculty lines in philosophy.

1b: I have heard anecdotal reports of senior scientists who spend most of their research time working on grant proposals. There are similar anecdotes of accomplished scientists being denied tenure, or otherwise losing their jobs, because they could not secure enough "soft" money to fund their position. I don't know if these anecdotes are representative, but I do know that grant funding is a double edged sword. Those who live by the grant die by the grant.

We should also think seriously about the kinds of grant money that is likely to be available in philosophy and what effects that might have on the direction of philosophical scholarship. Templeton is one example. Although some worries about their theological biases are overblown, nonetheless they do fund projects only about areas that they think are worthwhile. Similarly, there's lots of grant and donor money available from market-libertarian think tanks. The more that philosophy is dependent on donor money, the more power donors have to shape academic work - something that should be even more troubling if we simultaneously shift to more applied areas of work.

2: The more work philosophers have to do developing "outcomes assessment" measures and selling ourselves (and chasing grants, etc), the more we have to ask what we're making all those sacrifices for. At that point we're no longer fighting to be able to have a career studying and teaching philosophy - we're struggling specifically to keep philosophy teaching and scholarship within the university.

There is also something almost paradoxical in this sort of suggestion. Philosophy education (as it is now; as we know it) is valuable and important, so we have to radically transform it in order to preserve it. When we do that we must always be wary that we don't give up what is valuable about it in order to save it.

(5): While I don't doubt the existence of prestige bias, it is seriously problematic only as a secondary effect of the bad job market. In a world where there are enough decent, full-time jobs for most candidates, prestige only matters to those who care whether they end up at prestigious places.

It's a mistake to put ourselves in the position of trying to rank - among a pool of already talented, highly qualified people - who is and isn't a good philosopher by counting publications. The tragedy is not that the NYU student got a job with no publications - the tragedy is that most people have to publish as graduate students and that many still don't get decent jobs. There are a number of ways to be a great philosopher - only some of them involve prolific (and early) publications.