Humans as animals (West and East)

Humans are not animals according to Descartes' distinction of res cogitans and res extensa. They are also not animals according to many Christian theologians (Jesus came to save humans, not animals). Perhaps humans are not (only) animals also according to the Aristotelian definition of human beings as ``rational animals", which attributes to humans alone a distinctive character. Humans are also quite different than animals when it comes to their respective rights. But here starts a moot point:

1. If, in fact, humans have more rights than animals because they are the dominant group, then this resembles very much racism or any other dominion of one group over the other.
2. If, by contrast, humans have more rights than animals because they are different than animals, then what does this difference consist of? If it amounts to rationality, should psychically empaired human beings have no rights?

Since after the end of the Nazi experiments a (more or less) general consensus has been achieved about the fact that psychically empaired human beings deserve the same rights, one is led back either to No. 1 or to a different basis of the human claim for rights. This could be Peter Singer's claim that one's moral stand should be calculated not on the basis of one's ability to reach a soteriological goal or one's rational value but on the basis of one's ability of experiencing pain (Singer 1975). This includes psychically empaired human beings. But it also includes at least many animals (one might argue about the fact that many invertebrates with no nerve ganglia cannot literally speaking experience pain).

The discussion about the inclusion of animals within the realm of beings to whom human rights can be ascribed, thus, seems to hit a nerve in Western thought. It seems that no straight line can be legitimately drawn to separate animals and humans and that there is more a net of family resemblances than a straight opposition between the two groups (a dolphin or a gorilla, just to take an obvious example, seem to me to resemble a human being much more than they resemble an amoeba, although all three can be used for the sake of medical research or kept in zoo-like institutions).

The situation is slighly different in other traditions of thought. In Classical Chinese Confucian philosophy, for instance, the idea that we have stronger obligations towards the members of our extended family and towards further "proximate" people is a viable option and one could easily extend this model to animals, so that it would be legitimate to attribute rights first to the members of our families, then to members of our communities, then to further human beings, then to pet-animals, then to further animals with whom we are somehow connected and only at last to further animals. However, this option clashes with the Western ambition of building a universal ethical system, does not it?*

I wrote about Indian reflections on this topic in a forthcoming article (a preliminary draft of which is available here), where I basically argue that most Indian thinkers seem to see non-human and human animals along a hierarchical sequence with no brisk interruption. Daya Krishna connects this with the utilitaristic approach to knowledge which characterises most Indian explicit reflections about it:

The usual Indian analysis is centered around the hedonistic view of human nature which sees it as naturally seeking pleasure and avoding pain and has a pragmatic view of knowledge which sees the `truth' of knowledge in terms of its ability to avoid pain and afford pleasure to the humanking. But on this view no distinction is possible between the human and the animal world as the latter also is supposed to seek pleasure or avoid pain and `sees' the `truth' of its knowledge in terms of the `success' achieved by it in this enterprise. In fact, the whole learning theory in modern psychology and the training of animals is based on this premiss (2004, p. 237)

Let me just add that Daya Krishna is thinking of the first aphorism in the foundational text of the Nyāya school (NS 1.1.1), where knowledge is linked to the achievement of one's summum bonum. In another philosophical school, the Mīmāṃsā, animals are also considered on the same level as humans when it comes to the fact of desiring happiness (PMS chapter 6).

* I am grateful to L.E. for having discussed this topic with me.

I wrote about what ''nature'' should mean on this blog, here. Again on this blog, David Killoren has dedicated two insightful posts to the rights of animals owned by human beings and to how we can justify their "slavery". On why I am citing Daya Krishna, see this post. Within Chinese philosophy, on Confucius vs. Mozi regarding the universality of rights see this post by Eric Schwitzgebel.
(cross-posted, with minor modifications, on my personal blog)

 

Comments

[John Williams]

Interesting blog and interesting post. The Zhuangzi 莊子 text likewise never assumes a rigid distinction between human and non-human animals. It has a unique argumentative strategy that you might find interesting.

First, the text makes the following type of claim: "When people sleep in a damp place, they wakeup deathly ill and sore about the waist -- but what about eels? If people live in trees, they tremble with fear and worry -- but how about monkeys? Of these three, which 'knows' what is he right [zheng 正] place to live? People eat the flesh of their livestock, deer eat grass, snakes eat centipedes, hawks and eagles eat mice. Of these four, which 'knows' the right thing to eat? Monkeys take she-monkeys for mates, bucks mount does, male fish frolic with female fish, while humans regard Mao Qiang and Lady Li as great beauties -- but when fish see them they dart to the depths, when birds see them they soar into the skies, when deer see them they bolt away without looking back. Which of these four 'knows' what is rightly alluring" (Zhuangzi, Ziporyn trans, p.18).

The idea here is that we obviously wouldn't expect these species to live in the same ways (dao 道) as one another, nor would we expect them to make the same right/wrong (shi/fei 是/非) distinctions (bian 辯) for navigating the world.

This seems trivial, until you acknowledge that the text isn't assuming a rigid distinction between human and non-human animals. If the line between human and non-human animals isn't rigid, then one might naturally ask: What about various ways (dao 道) of engaging the world displayed within a species? If it's obvious we shouldn't coerce different animals into adhering to one way of life, then it shouldn't be obvious why we should coerce all beings within one species to adhere to one way of life.

But this is precisely what we try to do. Humans display a plurality of ways of life. Word use leads to disputation (bian 辯) (affirm or deny this proposition, and it is confirmed). Each disputant in a dispute is trying to assert his way (dao 道)of life over another's as the universal (chang 常) way (dao 道) with its own given virtue(s) (de 德). But isn't trying to straighten out (zheng 正) one way at the expense of all others as absurd as coercing one species into conformity with the way of life of another species?

This is precisely what the Zhuangzi text concludes: "From where I see it, the transitions of Humanity and Responsibility and the trails of right and wrong are hopelessly tangled and confused. How could I know how to distinguish which is right among them?" (Ibid.) (Note: this argument only begins to be compelling if you don't assume a rigid line of demarcation distinguishing human and non-human animals.)

[Elisa Freschi]

Thank you, John, for this insightful and rich comment. I cannot help but thinking of Plato's discussion of beauty (Hippias Major 289), which is so different, since it says that the ones monkeys deem to be the most beautiful female-monkeys look horrible according to men, and in the same way the ones whom men deem to be the most beautiful women look horrible in the eyes of gods. The argument is relativistic, like the one you present, but in Plato it is clear that there is a hierarchy: Female-monkeys are (objectively) less beautiful than women and women are (objectively) less beautiful than goddesses. Your text seems to presuppose a horizontal organization, in which each class of beings start with the same set of issues (finding a home, reproducing, eating…) and solves them in different ways. By contrast, in Plato the hierarchy has gods at its vertex, but human beings come next. One might wonder whether (Judeo-Christian) monotheism leads to an even less animal-friendly attitude, since God is made into something transcendent and different from His creatures, so that not even a hierarchy is stricto sensu possible.

[John Williams]

Elisa, I think your "horizontal organization" and "vertical hierarchy" distinction is very useful. I also agree that the vertical hierarchies have various unfortunate consequences regarding humans' attitudes toward (and treatment of) non-human animals.

If you're interested, this "Outer Chapter" from the Zhuangzi text makes the same move as the previous passage (and Burton Watson beautifully captures the Chinese in English):"Haven’t you heard this story? Once a sea bird alighted in the suburbs of the Lu capital. The marquis of Lu escorted it to the ancestral temple, where he entertained it, performing the Nine Shao music for it to listen to and presenting it with the meat of the Tailao sacrifice to feast on. But the bird only looked dazed and forlorn, refusing to eat a single slice of meat or drink a cup of wine, and in three days it was dead. This is to try to nourish a bird with what would nourish you instead of what would nourish a bird. If you want to nourish a bird with what nourishes a bird, then you should let it roost in the deep forest, play among the banks and islands, float on the rivers and lakes, eat mudfish and minnows, follow the rest of the flock in flight and rest, and live any way it chooses. A bird hates to hear even the sound of human voices, much less all that hubbub and to-do. Try performing the Xianchi and Nine Shao music in the wilds around Lake Dongting—when the birds hear it they will fly off, when the animals hear it they will run away, when the fish hear it they will dive to the bottom. Only the people who hear it will gather around to listen. Fish live in water and thrive, but if men tried to live in water they would die. Creatures differ because they have different likes and dislikes. Therefore the former sages never required the same ability from all creatures or made them all do the same thing."

[Elisa Freschi]

Thank you, John, very nice. It makes me think that it would be nice to organise a panel on humans and animals from the points of view of various philosophical schools.