In Defense of Dissertations -- a follow-up to Millikan's Dewey Lecture

Ruth Millikan's 2012 Dewey Lecture, which I first posted a link to the other day, has generated quite a stir on other philosophy blogs and social media. I have seen people urging one another to read it, and I've heard some people describe parts of it as "explosive." In this post, I want to follow up on Millikan's claim that encouraging philosophers to publish early and often is "genocidal" -- that it threatens to destroy the vitality and depth of our discipline from within. (p. 11)

When I began graduate school, 300-500 page dissertations systematically developing and defending "one big idea" were the rule. One simply could not receive one's PhD without coming up with "a great idea", and developing something like a systematic theory of that idea. I distinctly remember sitting in our grad lounge at the University of Arizona and reading some of the dissertations that were kept there. I was astonished. "How", I thought to myself, "could I ever climb a mountain like that?" The amount of thought, work, determination, and systematic thought it took to produce dissertations like those, I thought to myself, was truly impressive and important.

And indeed, it seems to me, there are a number of reasons why 300-500 page dissertations systematically developing new theories were once the rule.

The first thought, I think, was simply that the aim of a PhD program should be to create great (rather than merely good) philosophers, and that great philosophy requires the ability to develop new systems of thought. If, for instance, we look at the greatest contributions to philosophy in history -- whether we are talking about Kant's Critiques or whatever -- those contributions, by and large, were not "a handful of papers." They were wide-ranging, systematic theories. 

The second thought, I take is, is that unless the ability to think systematically in this kind of way is developed (and incentivized!) early -- in grad school, etc. -- it is unlikely to develop on its own. Habits are habits, and if one is merely taught (by one's mentors--leaders in the field!) to publish papers in grad school and then incentivized to publish papers or books based on papers in the years leading up to tenure, when will one learn how to think deeply, and systematically? Again, if all the incentive is to publish papers in Phil Review and then maybe a book (based on those papers) with OUP, but one is never taught or given any incentive to create something systematic like A Theory of Justice or the Critique of Pure Reason, the likelihood that one will ever learn how to create something like that diminishes.

The third thought, I take it, is that in order to think really systematically about ideas, and to develop new ideas that might "change the philosophical world", one needs to be steeped in philosophical history. The 300-500 page dissertations I read when I started grad school did not just deal with the last 10 years of the literature on, say, practical reasons or whatever. No, they went much farther than this: locating the theories they developed in history, often returning to some idea (from maybe 100 years ago) and attempting to rescue or revitalize it. And knowing the history of philosophy (and science) is profoundly important. As just one example of how not knowing history can lead philosophy astray, consider this recent article by Brogaard and Marlow (in Analysis!) claiming to refute a central element of Einstein's theory of relativity. The kinds of concerns Brogaard and Marlow raise in the paper were raised and definitively refuted almost 100 years ago. It shouldn't have taken these two follow-up articles to refute the worries again, but, unless we pay attention to history, these are precisely the kinds of things that can happen!

So, I say, there are a lot of (good) reasons for 300-500 page, systematic dissertations. These reasons were conveyed to me at one point by my dissertation advisor, Tom Christiano. Yet, as I progressed in grad school, Tom became a lone voice in the wilderness. Budget cuts and concerns about how long grad students were taking to finish their degrees were increasingly leading my, and other grad programs to scrap the requirement for massive dissertations in favor of another alternative: dissertations consisting of several related "star papers", papers which may be closely related, but not necessarily develop any systematic theory of anything. The important thing now was that one's "star papers" were "potentially publishable." And so it went. As time has gone on, I have come across more and more 100-120 page dissertations. Oftentimes, these dissertations consist of several good or great papers. But, is that all we should be demanding of grad students? And to what end? Does it incentivize deeply understanding the history of philosophical ideas, or does it mostly incentivize contributing in some new way to some "hot" trend in the literature? Does it incentivize the development of systematic thought -- the kind of thought that has, historically, led to great philosophical innovation and theorizing? Or, does it incentivize something less?

I leave it to you to think about and discuss. :)

Comments

[Richard Yetter Chappell]

Interesting questions. Let me add a few more:

(1) If graduate programs were to aim at creating "great" philosophers, how likely would they be to succeed? Would their graduates be, on the whole, better or worse philosophers than those who are trained to be "merely good"? If most would do worse, but the very best would be better, how should we evaluate such trade-offs?

(2) How does the work of young philosophers today (on the whole) compare with that of their counterparts a generation ago? (I don't know about the comparative claim, but my sense is that there are a lot of really great young philosophers doing excellent work these days. But our philosophical tastes may differ!)

(3) How much of a difference does one's graduate education actually make? If different people have varying dispositions towards doing more or less "systematic" work, is their graduate education all that likely to alter those dispositions? Presumably it makes some difference at the margins, but would a Kant or a Rawls be all that moved by the "incentives" you mention?

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Richard: Thanks for your comment. I think those are all great questions. Here are my thoughts.

On (1): I think the question of trade-offs implies a false presupposition (at least in the current context). I would say that we make more good *and* great philosophers by holding graduate students to the highest standards -- and a traditional dissertation is far more difficult than 3-5 related papers. I say this will all respect to people who have done the latter -- but there simply is no comparison. A 300-500 page systematic investigation of something is a far higher hurdle to overcome than a 100-120 page series of 3-5 papers, even if the papers are great. (Just some evidence besides the page differential: the sheer amount of time it takes for people to do traditional dissertations. Constructing a coherent "mountain" and then climbing it is creating and climbing a mountain, rather than a fell smaller hills).

Now, if we *did* have to choose between creating lots of good philosophers or a few great ones, that would be a difficult question of trade-offs. But, again, I don't think that's the issue.

On (2): I'm not sure. But, there have been people who have raised this question seriously. Recently, Eric Schwitzgabel wrote a post on "The Winnowing of the Greats" where he suggests we have a lot of "very goods" but few greats lately. (http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2007/08/on-winnowing-of-greats.html ). Also see http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2012/01/base-rate-of-kant.html

Then there are top names in philosophy -- including some top journal editors -- claiming that philosophy has become "safe, and a little boring." http://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2012/10/safe-and-a-little-boring.html

On (3): Again, this is just my feeling, but I think it makes ALL the difference. Whatever our own dispositions may be, graduate students are clearly deeply impacted by their grad school professors and the discipline around them. I don't think this can be denied. Anyone who has been in a graduate program knows it. When I was at Syracuse, *everyone* there was a Kripke and Lewis-ite. Why? Because that's what our professors -- Hawthorne, Sider, Weatherson, etc. -- held up as the ideal. And Hawthorne, Sider, Weatherson, etc., were our idols. We all wanted to do what they did. Similar things were true when I went to Arizona. We wanted to be like Paul, or Schmidtz, or Chalmers, or Christiano, or whomever. We did what they did.

No doubt there will always be those who rebel against the norms they are inculcated with. I did! :) But, the point is, the environment one is "philosophically raised in" undoubtedly has a profound impact on the kind of philosopher they are likely to become.

[Daniel Brunson]

I need to chew on this some more, but I wanted to make the point that Kant was nearly 60 when the 1st Critique came out (his dissertation was a dozen pages). Of course, we can simply substitute the 27 year old Hume and The Treatise, but even he was out of school for nearly 10 years.

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Daniel: Thanks for your comment.

Yes, but Kant was not a publishing machine. It took him a *long* time to become what he became. It took patience, and a couple of decades of NOT publishing (his "silent" years) to become the systematic, game-changing thinker he ultimately became.

On the other hand, let's look at more recent figures. Rawls published a handful of papers over the first two decades before "A Theory of Justice." People in his generation were given time and incentives -- in grad school and beyond -- to think beyond publishing paper after paper. And the result, I believe, were far more "game changing" works than we see today.

[Daniel Brunson]

Sure, but it seems that the drive to publish early and often and requiring c. 400 word dissertations are separate issues. Indeed, the examples suggest that often what makes a great philosopher is time and security, but that says more about the competitiveness of academia than the proper nature of graduate school, perhaps.

[philgrad]

Interesting post! A few thoughts:

I'm not sure why what you call "systematic" dissertations need to be 300-500 pages. Based on my own (very anecdotal) perusing of dissertations at my own graduate program, there never was a time when 300-500 page dissertations were the norm. It's true that the "three paper" model is pretty recent, but a lot of the dissertations in the last twenty years are in the ballpark of systematic dissertations - they're just usually 150-250ish pages.

If your beef is with the three paper model, that's fine. But I think that model is still very much a minority. Additionally, the average philosophy graduate program completion time is already terrible enough, and the opportunities post-graduate school are becoming evermore limited. I don't think graduate students should feel like they ought to be producing mammoth tomes before defending.

[Anthony Carreras]

It seems to me that things like your coursework and your comprehensive exams should serve the purpose developing a "deep understanding of the history of philosophical ideas." I don't see why the dissertation *needs* to serve this purpose.

Also, I think it is silly that you can get a law degree in three years, a medical degree in four years, but a Ph.D. in philosophy takes, on average, eight years or more. That doesn't make any good sense. And the 400 page dissertation (among other things) only exacerbates the problem.

[Marcus Arvan]

Phil grad: Thanks for your comment! I don't think they *have* to be 300-500 pages to be systematic. One can write something significantly shorter and have it be systematic, too (Wittgenstein's Tractatus is pretty damn systematic, but it is not exactly long!).

The point isn't length; it is that the tradition model of dissertation has been increasingly replaced by "several related papers." This is what I have worries about.

Anyway, I totally get the reasons for the change. You're right: completion rates, limited job opportunities, etc. But, there's a saying, "Don't throw the baby out with the bath water!" I think we could address these other issues without giving up the traditional dissertation -- and I think that would be preferable.

[Marcus Arvan]

Anthony: Thanks for your comment. Coursework and exams can give you a deep understanding in one sense (exposing you to a history of ideas). What it doesn't do is develop *your* ability to think systematically. It is one thing to read and understand systematic philosophers like Rawls, or Sidgwick, or whomever; it is another thing to learn how to think, and write, systematically oneself! And this takes practice. What kind of practice? Writing a dissertation. This was always the point of a traditional dissertation -- to get you to *do* something you haven't done before: not just write small papers, but come up with a truly wide-ranging, systematic theory of your own.

[Anthony Carreras]

Marcus - I agree that dissertations should teach you to think systematically. But I agree with philgrad (and with you!) that they need not be so long in order to be systematic. Nor do I think a dissertation that deals mainly with recent literature will, for that reason, fail to be systematic.