Some thoughts on Leiter's recent poll (redux)

(Note: This post is a revised version of an earlier post I retracted in order to revise the rhetorical tone).

Brian Leiter recently hosted a new poll on the question of which influential modern philosophers have had the most pernicious influence on philosophy. I disagree with the results, which can be found here, and so I want to say a few things about them, as well as about who I think has had the most pernicious influence on philosophy. :)

First, I am dismayed that Heidegger came out #1. Now, look, Heidegger was a Nazi. That makes him a deplorable human being. And he was a ridiculously terrible writer. That also makes him worthy of disapprobation (though far less, obviously, than being a Nazi). But, these are not the questions the poll was about. The question was not whether Heidegger was a bad dude, or even whether his philosophy has inspired or supported bad things outside of philosophy (facism, etc.). The question was whether his philosophy has had a pernicious influence on philosophy. And here I think this answer is: obviously no.

First, I think Heidegger clearly played a role in setting us straight on the nature of objects and cognition. Prior to Heidegger, philosophers from Descartes to Locke, etc., took objects to be stuff. Heidegger showed that objects should be defined functionally (what makes this a hammer is its role in use). And, although one commenter on my previous post suggested we have Plato and Aristotle to thank for this view of objects, the view languished for millennia, and it is Heidegger we have to thank for returning the functionalist view of objects to the fore in modern philosophy.

I also think Heidegger's insight about objects underlies a lot of other important insights since: for instance, David Chalmers' (and my) suggestion that the "simulation hypothsesis" is a better thought of as a metaphysical rather than an epistemological hypothesis. There are chairs in the Matrix just insofar as to be a chair is to be the sort of thing one can sit on (and there are human bodies in the matrix just insofar as human bodies are the kinds of things that...). 

We also have Heidegger to thank, I think, for blowing up the subject-object distinction (we are fundamentally embedded in the world around us, and therefore cannot sensibly doubt the world's existence any more than we can doubt our own existence) -- thereby anticipating Wittgenstein's later rejection of external-world skepticism in On Certainty.

Relatedly, I think we have Heidegger to thank for inspiring the extended mind hypothesis (insofar as, again, he denies we can make sense of our minds independently of the world around us). Indeed, when I was doing cognitive science in the early 2000's, the most common philosopher name I heard from "enactivist" A.I. researchers -- researchers, like Rodney Brooks, who challenged the orthodox view that A.I. is a matter of propositional knowledge with the view that cognition involves distributed and direct engagement with the external world -- was Heidegger! 

This is deep and important stuff, and anyone who ranks Heidegger as #1 as "the most pernicious" influence on philosophy is, I think, ignoring it. I am also unhappy with the fact that Hegel and Foucoult are #2 and #3, respectively (clearly, Leiter pollees do not much like "continental" philosophers - big surprise there!). Look, I have problems with Hegel, but I also think Hegel, and especially Foucoult, have a lot of good to offer (though I won't belabor this).

Who, then, do I think has been the most pernicious influence out of the philosophers listed in the poll? For me, the answer is easy: I think it is G.E. Moore. Here's why.

First, it is Moore we have to thank -- probably above all others -- for the idea that philosophy should begin with and work to defend "commonsense." I think this exactly the wrong way to go about philosophy. The job of philosophy is to be better than commonsense. Commonsense is, and always has been, morally, factually, and conceptually confused, and we have no business "beginning with commonsense." Moreover, I think that in philosophical practice, this feature of Moore's philosophy has been particularly pernicious. It is what underlies the now-common retorts, "I just think that is counterintuitive", and, "Yes, but that conflicts with commonsense." Now, I know there are those who think this is the right way to do philosophy, but I don't...and I think there are more and more people (to give just a few) who are beginning to realize it. 

This brings me to my second problem with Moore, which is that it is he, more than any other single philosopher, who we have to thank for the rise of intuitionism, the idea that we can know things by intuition alone, particularly moral intuitions. I think both ideas are pernicious, but that moral intuitionism is particularly pernicious. After all, the idea there is that we "just know" moral truths, skepticism be damned. I think this is no way to do moral philosophy. A sound moral philosophy has to deal with deep questions of normativity, human cognition and sentiments, etc. Just helping yourself to "moral facts known by intuition" is (in my view) philosophically irresponsible. There are just too many reasons to wonder whether morality is just a nice myth -- a set of practices and norms that help us get along (for more, see Richard Joyce's book, or better yet, the book I'm currently writing;) -- to help ourselves to "objective moral facts knowable by intuition." Furthermore, and perhaps worst of all, I think Moore's legacy has encouraged us to make bad moves in the classroom. Introductory ethics texts often claim to "refute" relativism by claiming that "it does not sit well with our intuitions about disagreement, moral progress, etc." -- this despite the fact that, like, none of my students have those intuitions, and despite the fact that there is really sophisticated philosophical work defending relativism.

Third, I think Moore is responsible for a number of trends in hard core meta-ethics that I personally think are huge philosophical steps backward: (A) the now-ubiquitious claim that normative reasons are basic, (B) the idea that we can determine whether there are moral facts (and what those facts are like) without doing any normative theorizing, and finally (C) hard-core moral realism, which holds that moral facts exist independently of any human attitudes. I won't go into detail here on what I think is wrong with all of these views (you'll have to wait for the book I'm working on for that!), but in a nutshell, I think all of these views are akin to the phlogiston theory of fire, aehter theory of space, and life-force theory of life. I think they posit "ghosts and goblins" to do serious philosophical work. I think there is no sense at all to the claim that "reasons are basic", or that moral facts exist independently of us, etc. To put in Mackie's good old terms, my complaint is that all the claims are unconscionably "queer": they "explain" things like reasons, morality, etc., by not explaining anything, but rather, by simply positing unexplained explainers. Which I think is philosophically bad.

Anyway, those are the problems I have with Moore. He might have been a great person, but I think he has affected philosophy -- both in terms of how it is done today, and in terms of (what I take to be) big steps backwards theoretically -- in very negative ways.

Now, although I've been critical of some dominant philosophical trends in doing it -- and, by extension, some of the work people do (e.g. hard-core moral realism, etc.), I think I've been nice and measured about it this time. :) I don't think there's anything inherently "unsafe or unsupportive" -- i.e. contrary to this blog's mission -- in challenging dominant philosophical trends. Although some of the worries I raise here may of course call into question some people's work -- i.e. things they may cherish -- I also believe this is something we can, and should, do in a supportive way. Just because I think certain trends are bad doesn't make me right. I am more than willing to listen, discuss, and rethink my positions. But, I do think it is important to reflect on precisely what it is we're doing, and to share with one another whatever doubts or misgivings we may have about dominant trends (provided, of course, we do so in a measured way -- which, again, I have tried to do better this time!).

Finally, I guess I will add that I agree with the high rankings of Wittgenstein and Nietzsche. It's not so much their philosophy I think has been pernicious -- though I do think Nietzsche's defense of the ubermensch is morally dangerous (not only clearly influencing Hitler, but also Ayn Rand). My main gripe with those two is the image of "the mad genius philosopher who treats others horribly" they've engendered, and which some  students (and some professional philosophers) have adopted.

Comments

[Clayton]

Metaethicists! Fuck me. I mean, say what you want about the tenets of Heideggarianism, Dude, at least it's an ethos.

[Even funnier than last time!]

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Clayton: yeah, but each time you tell the joke I'm more confused than before! ;) last time I was pretty sure you were poking fun at me (viz. "Come on Marcus, Nazism versus moral facts!?"). This time I seriously wonder whether you are poking fun at meta-ethicists (viz. they're not theorizing about *anything*!). Which is it?

[Clayton]

Sorry, Big Lebowski reference. There's a discussion of the relative merits and demerits of nihilists and Nazis. (The metaethicists/nihilists, like, don't even have an ethos, man.)

[Marcus Arvan]

I felt like it was a reference to *something*, I just couldn't think of what it was! Anyway, this aggression will not stand, man. Oh, and that's just, like, your opinion, man. ;)

[Eugene]

Re: Your complaints about Moore and metaethics

The main difference between this and your original post is that you've narrowed your rhetorical complaints from metaethicists in general to robust realists in metaethics. And it seems to me that the problem with these kinds of posts is that space requirements force you to merely present views in the form of their slogans, and you end up caricaturing them in doing so. I'm no "hard-core" realist myself, but I do take people like Scanlon to have arrived at their views via interesting and compelling arguments for them (see his new book, for example). In contrast, by merely giving us the slogans, your post gives the impression that realists like Scanlon are foot-stumping dogmatists, when this couldn't be further from the truth. Posts like this might not violate the mission of the blog, but they sure do make it a lot like other lame, cheap-shot-taking popular outlets on the internet like Leiter's.

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Eugene: I'm sorry you feel that way. I don't think I merely leave things like this as slogans, however. Usually, when I criticize views on this blog, I give detailed arguments for why I think what I do. This post is different, obviously, because I was trying to list several ways in which I think Moore's influence has been pernicious. I have discussed some of these ways in detail before (viz. intuition-mongering, etc.).

That being said, you are sort of right on the moral realism case: in this case, I have more or less just given a "slogan" -- a broad brush picture of what I think is wrong. But, I have also said I am currently writing a book on this, and I hope to devote a great deal of detailed discussion to it in the future.

On the Scanlon case, I actually *do* think his arguments amount to table-pounding. I've felt that way ever since I read his 1998 book, and I haven't seen anything that seems to me less table-pounding since. Usually (though not always), the case for "reasons as basic" is made by reference to *intuitions* about what is and is not a reason, the explanatory role reasons play, etc. I find none of the arguments compelling in the slightest -- but, if you'd like to hash some of them out with me here, I'd be happy to!

Trust me, I don't want this blog to give lame "slogans" like some others -- but, I do have to say, I *rarely* just give slogans; I usually defend my points in detail. This post was unique in its scope.

[Nick]

Personally, I like provocative posts, so provoke away!

Response to provocation: I'm assuming you're willing to extend your critique of the (allegedly) Moorean emphasis on "common sense" to Aristotle's method of preserving the endoxa?

[Rachel]

1. Why are we even dignifying anything Leiter does?

2. Why are we willing to engage in this really horrible exercise? I don't know about you, but a huge problem in our field is treating some philosophy or philosophers as garbage and not worth studying. So how should people feel who work on G.E.Moore's philosophy? It sure seems to me like you're saying, implicitly if not explicitly, that they're wasting their time (at best).

I'm not impressed.

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Rachel: Thanks for your comment. I understand and appreciate your concerns. I care deeply about, and work hard at, being a positive force in the world (in whatever small ways I can), as opposed to a negative one. For this reason, I generally try to be constructive -- especially on this blog -- rather than critical. And so perhaps it would be better for me to not engage in these kinds of exercises in the future. But, let me share why I engaged in the exercise -- what my rationale for it was. As you will see below, I'm not convinced that my post or this conversation is a horrible exercise -- but, I am willing to listen and rethink my view. Perhaps, if we discuss the rationale, I can come to a better understanding of whether this was a bad exercise (as you believe), and whether I should avoid doing similar things in the future.

On (1): whatever one may think of Leiter, I think as a purely sociological issue there is great value to knowing what our fellow philosophers think. I think it is important to know that people who read his blog think Heidegger is the most pernicious modern philosopher, and consider Hegel and Foucoult among the most pernicious as well. I think these things are important to know for a number of reasons. Among other things, it can clue us into how our fellow philosophers conceive of what they'r doing, and to what they think is valuable/not valuable. I think it is important to know these things because it can enable us to discuss (and question!) those trends. So, for instance, as I explain in the post, I think it is important to know that Leiter's readers hold Heidegger in such low esteem. I think it is important to know this so that we can question that very phenomenon -- explaining to people why we (or at least I!) think Heidegger is worth taking seriously. Such conversations are, I believe, important to have. It can help us better understand philosophy, and the contributions of particular philosophers.

On (2): I *entirely* agree with you that a huge problem in our field is "treating some philosophy or philosophers as garbage and not worth studying" -- though perhaps not for the same reasons as you. In my view, this phenomenon (questioning the value of certain approaches to philosophy) is problematic primarily when it is used to denigrate philosophy practiced by historically marginalized minorities (women philosophers, black philosophers, etc.). I think it is problematic in these cases precisely because it functions to *continue* harmful patterns of exclusion.

But, is questioning the value of *dominant* trends the same sort of thing? I don't think so. Quite the contrary, I think it is *important* to question dominant traditions precisely because those traditions function to protect entrenched interests. It bothers me, for instance, that hard-core metaethics gets conferred so much prestige when (in my view) something far more philosophically valuable -- feminist philosophy -- is systematically denigrated. Questioning dominant trends and practices can, in my view, play an important role of helping to shift *perceptions* and trends in a new, less exclusionary direction -- and I think this is a valuable goal.

Furthermore, I think there is inherent value in questioning what we are doing. All too often in academic fields (and elsewhere!), people just go with the flow, doing what they do, without questioning the foundations of what it is they are doing. Here, for instance, is an analogous case. In physics over the past 30+ years the dominant paradigm was string theory, and a vast amount of funding and resources were invested in string theory to the *exclusion* of minority views. Few people in the field were willing to question the string theory orthodoxy -- and now, 30 years later, physics is in all-out crises because none of the predictions of string theory (and supersymmetry) have been realized.

If I think something similar is going on in certain areas of philosophy, should I just keep my mouth shut? If so, why? Isn't this silencing *me*? Shouldn't I be able to publicly question trends I find problematic? Shouldn't *anyone* be permitted -- and indeed, I would say, encouraged -- to do this? By my lights, our discipline needs *more* self-awareness and self-criticism, not less. And so I think it is important to discuss these matters publicly, rather than muzzle people.

Finally, I see no reason why criticizing dominant trends -- or even large bodies of work -- should be taken personally. Look, I work on Kant and Rawls. I think they are worth doing work on. But, I realize, not everyone feels this way. If someone thinks that Kant or Rawls is a waste of time, I want to hear why! And I think this is only proper for any philosopher. Are we after truth, or, are we just after defending our egos and careers? I would hope it is the former. If someone were to suggest to me that work on Kant and Rawls is all a waste of time, I would not consider it appropriate for me to get upset about it -- any more than I think it would be appropriate for a string theorist to get upset about someone questioning the value of string theory. For, questioning others and ourselves is important! If someone were to question why I am working on Kant and Rawls, it would give me the opportunity to (1) defend what I'm doing, and (2) understand why other people are skeptical of it. Both opportunities are, I think, a positive thing. There is nothing "unsafe" or "unsupportive" about it. Critical conversation is what we do, and it affords us opportunities to learn. Which, I take it, should be our aim.

That, at least, is where I am coming from. If you still think I'm in the wrong, I am more than willing to listen! :)

[Eugene]

Thanks for the response, Marcus.

Here's a suggestion:

If you don't have anything substantive to say, then don't say anything at all.

To take the metaethics example again, every time you claim that Scanlon's arguments amount to mere "table-pounding" without backing it up, it comes off as trash talk. And when you trash talk the work of others in this way, you contribute to this sense that their work and any work that engages it, isn't worth doing. I'm also sorry to say that, no, pointing us to your unpublished book doesn't mitigate this impression.

And by the way, the most charitable reading of people like Scanlon is that they arrive at their brands of robust realism from arguments by elimination. Again, read his new book, where he tries to show that his main contenders (e.g. expressivists, desire theorists) all face fatal problems. Robust realism is best thought of as a position of last resort, and on such a reading, the idea that someone like Scanlon is merely being dogmatic doesn't really fit the bill.

[Marcus Arvan]

Hi Eugene: Thanks for your reply. It really wasn't my intent to trash talk (rather, it was merely my intent to get a conversation started about some general concerns I have), but I take your point. I'll read Scanlon's most recent book for sure. I *do* know common arguments that alternative views face "fatal problems", but I've never found those arguments persuasive -- in large part because they often seem to me to be based upon the implication that (e.g.) desire accounts have counterintuitive implications: implications which, following Kate Manne, I think may be sad but *true* (see e.g. Kate Manne's piece on this, "Internalism about reasons: sad but true?" http://philpapers.org/rec/MANIAR ). I also think there are forms of constitutivism about normativity that are coherent and well-grounded.

But anyway, I appreciate your point. Although I think it is important to critically discuss trends in the discipline, I think you are right that it should be done in a substantive way.