An area philosopher is reported to have accomplished something long thought impossible: a definitive refutation of Ludgwig Wittgenstein's famous Private Language Argument. In an exclusive recent interview, the philosopher, who for the time being prefers not to be named, announced, "I've done it. I have definitively refuted the Private Language Argument." When asked to provide a detailed reconstruction of the refutation, the philosopher said that the result is still preliminary, and currently "undergoing peer-review."
The philosopher did, however, give a few clues: "It is a very difficult proof - almost impossible to put into words, really. I doubt the referees will understand it. But okay, if you really want to know, here's the best I can describe it. I introspected a particular experience of mine -- a particular shade of red. I assigned it the name 'S.' I then looked away from the red object, and then looked back. It was the same shade! And so I named it 'S' again. But, of course, no one else can possibly experience my experience of that shade of red, so the language is private." He then gave the following brief demonstration. He stared intently at the plastic red beer cup in his hand, closed his eyes, opened them, stared intently at the cup again, and explained, "Nice...QED yet again!"
When asked to elaborate how he knew "the shade of red initially named 'S'" was the same redness he later named 'S", thus coming to terms with Wittgenstein's objection that such a naming -- a putative private language -- would need some public criterion for success, the philosopher excitedly replied, "That's the trick of the proof. I can't possibly provide a public criterion for my act. The act of naming was private to me, so my naming both red shades 'S' was a private language!" When asked whether this potentially groundbeaking line of argument is refuted by recent empirical research indicating that individuals are unable to introspectively distinguish subtly different color shades from one another, the philosopher cavalierly replied, "I just don't have that intuition."
When questioned about whether appealing to intuitions in this case is a good form of argument -- particularly in light of how philosophical intuitions (about absolute space and time, heavenly orbits, etc.) have stood up to empirical findings throughout history -- the philosopher, surprisingly, had a reply ready to hand. "Every theory has its costs. Fortunately, my theory has many partners in crime. If we were to reject appeal to intuitions in this case, we would have to reject them in all other cases: the intuition that moral realism is true because it is the best explanation of moral language and behavior, the intuition that evolution cannot explain consciousness or trait selection, and so on. Indeed, we would have to reject armchair intuitions generally! But philosophy cannot do without intuitions. If philosophers didn't appeal to intuitions -- if, for instance, philosophers of science studied physics or philosophers of mind specialized in evolutionary theory, or really, paid attention to any empirical facts whatsoever -- we would no longer be doing philosophy. We'd be doing science!"
When asked the further question, "How many fallacies can you possibly commit in one long train of reasoning?", the philosopher replied, "Well, that depends. Are we talking logical possibility, metaphysical possibility, epistemic possibility, erotetic possibility, or alethic possibility?" When asked to, "take his pick", the philosopher replied, "Well, if I take my pick, it really depends on whether we approach the issue through a possible worlds semantics, Aristotelian powers-essentialism, etc. Also, are we assuming S5? S4? K?"
In the end, the philosopher remains cautiously optimistic about his refutation of the Private Language Argument. "I could be wrong, I suppose", he said, "but I just don't have that intuition. It seems to me that the argument is sound, and as we all know, seemings provide prima facie justification for belief in the propositions they are seemings-of!"
Oh, and happy April Fools Day!
Awesome :-)
*Close my eyes*
It’s the same joke. Therefore the argument is valid.
Posted by: Pierre | 04/01/2014 at 11:43 AM